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What the Trump Administration
Taught Us About the
Vulnerabilities of EPA’s ScienceBased Regulatory Processes:
Changing the Consensus
Processes of Science into the
Confrontational Processes of
Law
Bernard D. Goldstein†
Abstract
Under President Trump, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) was largely successful in at least temporarily achieving the
administration’s policy goals. It did so, in part, by significantly altering
or distorting the processes used under prior Republican and Democratic
EPA leadership to obtain consensus opinion of the scientific community
on issues pertinent to EPA’s science-based regulatory activities. In this
article I explore the extent to which these changes reflect replacing the
norms of science with norms more appropriate to the advocacy practices
of law. Under the Biden Administration, we can anticipate restoration
of the norms of science that previously guided the scientific consensus
processes used by EPA. However, the lesson of the Trump
administration is that these norms need buttressing by developing and
strengthening laws that govern the selection of members of EPA’s
external scientific and technical advisory committees, their deliberative
processes, and the literature reviewed by EPA.

†

Dean Emeritus of the University of Pittsburgh Graduate School of Public
Health. From 1981–83 he was chair of EPA’s Clean Air Scientific Advisory
Committee and subsequently served as President Reagan’s appointee as
EPA Assistant Administrator for Research Development. He is a member
of the National Academy of Medicine, for whom he has chaired or served
on more than twenty committees. He has also chaired numerous
committees related to environmental issues at the local, national, and
international levels. He is particularly interested in the interface between
science and law and has written on this subject in the legal and scientific
literature. In 2015, he was a visiting professor at the University of Cologne
Department of Political Science and European Affairs.
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Introduction
When teaching students or colleagues about participating in
regulatory or other law-based proceedings, I often begin by talking
about playing basketball while growing up in New York City. I wasn’t
particularly good, so my playing time was mostly in pickup games at
different local courts. While the central objective always was to score
by putting the ball through the hoop, each court had its own subsidiary
rules which could affect the outcome. Do you need to win by one or
two baskets? How many times did you have to pass the ball before your
team could score? For science-based regulatory decision making,
scientists and policy makers have the same central objective – to use
the best science for the most effective policies. But the subsidiary rules
may differ for each decision process depending upon such factors as the
legal basis for the regulation and on intra-agency practices often
developed over decades. For street basketball, the rules could change,
so it was important to check before you started playing. But the rules
were always consonant with the central objective of scoring the most
baskets. Further, it was a given that the rules would never change in
the middle of the game.
In this paper, I will review how the Trump administration’s EPA
leadership attempted to, and partially succeeded, in changing the
central objective of basing EPA’s regulatory decision-making on the
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best possible science. They did so by altering subsidiary rules on how
this science is obtained and interpreted, in some cases blatantly in the
midst of a regulatory decision process.
I contend that these changes can be understood largely as altering
the processes to approximate truth from those used by science to those
used by law. In essence, the EPA made a move from consensus to
confrontation. Although law and policy (and politics) differ from each
other, throughout this article I will intentionally conflate them to focus
on the common denominator of advocacy which is central to law,
focusing on the area in which their overlap is most pertinent to my
thesis of the central role of advocacy.1 I note that, of the fifteen EPA
administrators confirmed by the U.S. Senate, nine have been lawyers.2
Law and science are distinguished professions. Each has an
identifiable knowledge-based core that requires advanced education.
Each has a high level of societal recognition, responsibility and
accountability. Each has long-standing traditions and standards that
underlie their ethical code of conduct. For much of what they do,
lawyers and scientists act separately. In some instances, the two
professions work together, such as in the fields of toxic torts, forensic
evidence, and patent law. In these areas their respective roles are
reasonably well-defined, although subject to change.3 One activity

1.

Janice V. Arellano, writing the Practice Points column on the American
Bar Association web page, points out that “Law students and new
attorneys need to understand that the practice of law and policymaking
are completely different areas but require the development of similar skill
sets of quality writing, advocacy and networking.” Janice V. Arellano,
Using Litigation Skills in the Public Policy Arena, A.B.A (Feb. 28, 2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/minoritytrial-lawyer/practice/2017/using-litigation-skills-in-the-public-policyarena/ [https://perma.cc/65WG-9QQP]. Much scholarly work about the
science/law and science/policy interfaces has covered the role of evidence
and the role of advocacy. See generally Wendy E. Wagner, The “Bad
Science” Fiction: Reclaiming the Debate Over the Role of Science in
Public Health and Environmental Regulation, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
63 (2003); SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS
POLICYMAKERS 87 (1990) [hereinafter THE FIFTH BRANCH]; Sheila
Jasanoff, Procedural Choices in Regulatory Science, 4 RISK 143-60
(1993).

2.

Seven of the first eight EPA Administrators (counting Ruckelshaus twice)
were lawyers. This was followed successively from 2001 to 2017 by five
non-lawyers. Of the six non-lawyers, four had previously worked at EPA
and the other two had been state governors. The two most recent EPA
Administrators, Scott Pruitt and Andrew Wheeler, are both lawyers.
EPA’s
Administrators,
EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/50/epasadministrators [https://perma.cc/Q48Y-69MX].

3.

An example of a change is the Supreme Court’s Daubert decision that
increased the role of judges in deciding what science can be put in front
of a jury. See Margaret A. Berger, What has a Decade of Daubert
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which brings scientists and lawyers in close contact is science-based
regulation at the EPA. In this article, I will draw on significant
experience performing and interpreting environmental health science,
including service as President Reagan’s appointee as the EPA Assistant
Administrator for Research and Development, and on an acquaintance
with the law.4 Through the years I have learned much from legal
scholars who have focused on explaining the law science interface to
lawyers and to judges.5 But my primary approach, and bias, is that of
a physician scientist and a toxicologist who recognizes that much of
what is understood about health science has come from observing the
perturbations in human biology caused by diseases and by toxic agents.
In this article I am attempting to further the understanding of the lawscience interface by observing the perturbations caused by the Trump
Administration, focusing particularly on the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency.

Wrought? 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S59 (2005). See infra Section II.F for
further discussion of the Daubert decision.
4.

I am a physician who in 1966–68 served in the U.S. Public Health Service
Division of Air Pollution prior to it being incorporated into the newly
formed EPA. I have authored over 200 papers in the scientific literature,
mostly on environmental topics. Relevant to the present article is my
background in science advisory functions, at EPA and to some extent in
law. Publications in the legal literature include co-authoring the Reference
Guide on Toxicology in the Federal Judicial Center’s Reference Manual
on Scientific Evidence for each of its three editions, writing a few papers
on toxic substances and tort or regulatory law, and co-authoring a
textbook for nonlawyers (RUSSELLYN S. CARRUTH AND BERNARD D.
GOLDSTEIN, ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH LAW: AN INTRODUCTION (2013)). In
toxic tort suits I have worked roughly equally for plaintiffs and defense. I
am an elected member of both the American Society for Clinical
Investigation and the National Academy of Medicine and have chaired
over a dozen National Academy of Sciences committees related to
environmental science and public health. President Reagan appointed me
as Assistant Administrator for Research and Development, serving under
Administrators Ruckelshaus and Thomas. I chaired the Clean Air Science
Advisory Committee under Administrator Gorsuch, and as an academic
have chaired or served on a variety of ad hoc EPA committees. For the
Health Effects Institute, I chaired the Research Committee. I have chaired
advisory committees for other federal or state agencies, the UN
Environmental Program and the World Health Organization. More
recently I served as a member of the Science Policy Committee of the
Federation of American Societies of Experimental Biology. During my
career I have served in an advisory capacity roughly equally for
environmental NGOs and for the chemical and petrochemical industries.

5.

I particularly acknowledge Sheila Jasanoff, Wendy Wagner, Gary
Marchant, John Applegate, Joe Cecil and David Faigman and his
colleagues, and the late Margaret Berger who through the years have been
willing to spend time attempting to educate a physician about the
law/science interface. I apologize to them and to the reader for my
misunderstandings and oversimplifications.
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I will first look at differences between the two fields relevant to my
thesis that replacement of EPA’s scientific consensus processes with
those most appropriate to the law are central to understanding many
of the actions of Trump’s EPA leadership. I will consider pertinent
distinguishing characteristics between law and science, including the
role of advocacy; ethical standards; metrics of success; and the
difference between going up alleys to see if they are blind versus not
asking a question for which you do not know the answer. I will consider
the role of the EPA’s organizational structure in setting the tone for
the interface between science and law, and will describe some of the
previous attempts to perturb the consensus processes relevant to the
scientific underpinning of governmental decision.
These consensus approaches have in the past helped regulators
make reasonably effective science-based rules, doing so not because
science is necessarily good, but because such rules are inherently more
likely to be successful in achieving the EPA’s mandated goals.6
I will not respond to the numerous diatribes against the EPA’s
science and scientists, some of which include recommendations to
remove the Office and Research and Development (ORD) from the
EPA, or to dismantle the EPA because it can’t get its science right.7
While alterations and refinements to the processes for obtaining the
scientific basis for regulation have been not infrequent in the past, it is
my opinion that at no time has the EPA’s approach to understanding
the science appropriate for regulation been subject to such drastic
change as has occurred under the Trump administration.8
6.

A recent critique of EPA’s actions on air pollution repeated the pertinent
old saw “Science without policy is science; policy without science is
gambling.” Gretchen T. Goldman & Francesca Dominici, Don’t Abandon
Evidence and Process On Air Pollution Policy, 363 SCIENCE 1398 (2019).

7.

See Henry I. Miller, Happy Birthday EPA?, REGULATION 4, 6 (2011),
https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/2011/
4/regv34n1-brieflynoted.pdf [https://perma.cc/5U8C-F589]. See also The
EPA: More Trouble Than It’s Worth and Should Be Abolished, Says Dr.
Miller,
AM. COUNCIL SCI. & HEALTH (Mar.
29,
2011),
http://www.acsh.org/factsfears/newsID.2484/news_detail.asp
[https://perma.cc/FS4T-MG9K]. Jay Lehr of the Heartlands Institute has
argued that EPA ought to be disbanded and its responsibilities turned
over to states, an opinion that he says is motivated in part by EPA’s
incredibly poor science. Jay Lehr, Foreword to RICH TRZUPEK,
REGULATORS GONE WILD: HOW THE EPA IS RUINING AMERICAN INDUSTRY,
at xi (2011). For an antidote to these critiques, see generally Wendy
Wagner, It Isn’t Easy Being a Bureaucratic Expert: Celebrating the EPA’s
Innovations, 70 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1093 (2020).

8.

In an op ed I described why I would have resigned as chairperson of
CASAC appointed by Gorsuch, or Assistant Administrator of EPA
appointed by Reagan, had either attempted to do what Administrator’s
Pruitt and Wheeler have attempted. Bernard D. Goldstein, Opinion: If I
Were Still Working at the EPA, I Would Resign, THE WASH. POST (Apr.
2,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/if-i-were-still-
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I write from the perspective of an academic scientist. My focus will
be on two Congressionally-mandated EPA advisory committees: the
Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC) and the Science
Advisory Board (SAB).9 I generally will not consider the specifics of the
science underlying the many EPA decisions under Scott Pruitt and
Andrew Wheeler, which have relaxed environmental controls.10 Nor is
the heightened involvement of stakeholders, including communities,
which have characterized environmental health science in recent
decades, directly pertinent to this paper.11

I.

Differences Between Science and Law Pertinent
to Environmental Regulation
A.

The Role of Advocacy

Central to the legal profession is advocacy for clients. Central to
science is a belief that scientific facts speak for themselves.12 In my view
working-at-the-epa-i-would-resign/2019/04/02/88e6e2b8-519a-11e9-88a1ed346f0ec94f_story.html
[https://perma.cc/C4CZ-PWGS].
Ronald
Reagan came to Washington with much the same anti-EPA rhetoric as
Donald Trump and chose Anne Gorsuch as EPA Administrator. Ms.
Gorsuch was previously considered the most anti-science of EPA’s
Administrators. Terry Yosie & Bernard D. Goldstein, Environmental
Science at EPA: Providing Good Science for Relevant Policy, EPA AT 50
(A. James Barnes, John D. Graham and David Konisky, eds.), to be
published by Rowman and Littlefield 2021. See also Bernard D. Goldstein,
EPA at 40: Reflections on the Office of Research and Development. 21
DUKE ENV’TL. L. AND POLICY F. 295 (2010).
9.

The Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee was established in the 1977
Clean Air Act Amendments. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(2) (1977). The EPA
Science Advisory Board was authorized in the Environmental Research,
Development, and Demonstration Authorization Act (ERDDAA). 42
U.S.C. § 4365 (2018).

10.

Nadia Popovich et al., The Trump Administration Rolled Back More
Than 100 Environmental Rules. Here’s the Full List., N.Y. TIMES (July
15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/climate/trumpenvironment-rollbacks.html [https://perma.cc/RY86-9WMR].

11.

See, e.g., two major advisory processes that have placed risk assessment
within
the
context
of
stakeholder
involvement:
THE
PRESIDENTIAL/CONG. COMM’N ON RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MGMT.,
FRAMEWORK
FOR
ENV’TAL
HEALTH
RISK
MGMT.
(1997),
https://oaspub.epa.gov/eims/eimscomm.getfile?p_download_id=36372
[https://perma.cc/XUC4-7VHA]; NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L
ACADS., SCIENCE AND DECISIONS: ADVANCING RISK ASSESSMENT (2009).
For a discussion of community partnerships at the National Institutes of
Environmental Health Sciences, see Maureen Lichtveld et al., Then and
Now: Lessons Learned from Community Academic Partnerships in
Environmental Health Research, 15 ENV. RES. 117 (2016).

12.

Of course, these are central tendencies rather than absolute rules:
advocacy in law is bounded by numerous constraints, and advocacy
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the role of advocacy is the most relevant distinction between science
and law and is central to other distinguishing factors discussed below.
The different approaches to advocacy between law and science are
central to the changes imposed or sought by Trump’s EPA leadership.
One example is the difference in the way that experts are chosen to
participate. While at the EPA I was fascinated by the confusion caused
by the two different approaches to select scientists used by both EPA
and its stakeholders during and subsequent to the regulatory process.13
On most issues for which there was a reasonably large body of scientific
information and of informed scientists, one could imagine that separate
polling of each of the perhaps thousands of knowledgeable scientists as
to the appropriate numerical standard would lead to a range of numbers
that would fit a bell-shaped curve.14 The EPA’s approach, common to
consensus processes, has been to carefully select a much smaller number
of representative scientists with the relevant breadth and depth of
expertise to serve on a committee to review the evidence and through
a deliberative process make a numerical recommendation that would
approximate the center of the bell-shaped curve. As discussed in more
detail below, the reward structure in science leads the committee
participants to usually, but not always, come toward a general
agreement.15 In contrast, during the seemingly inevitable lawsuits
resulting EPA decisions, an ethical and well-trained lawyer will look for
individual scientists at one end of the interpretation spectrum knowing
full well that the lawyer on the opposing side will be doing the same at
the other end of the spectrum. The fact that an ethical, well-trained
journalist seeks to balance their story about any controversial issue by
quoting scientists at either end of the curve tends to reinforce the public
impression that there are two opposing points of view rather than a
reasonable scientific consensus somewhere in the center, or that there
is a preponderance of scientists at one end.16
B.

Ethical Issues

An illustration that law and science can have contrasting ethical
obligations relevant to the role of advocacy and pertinent to public
health regulation is the Bridgestone Tire incident. As described by New
York Times reporter Keith Bradsher, more than 270 people are believed
to have died in vehicle accidents caused by a specific tire product

certainly occurs in science, particularly for one’s own interpretation of
scientific findings.
13.

Bernard D. Goldstein, Risk Assessment and the Interface Between Science
and Law, 14 COLUM. J. ENV’TL. L. 343 (1987).

14.

Id.

15.

See infra Part II, Section C and note 27 (discussing deterring factors).

16.

Climate change is an example. See infra note 32.
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defect.17 This was known to law firms specializing in this type of product
defect which sued the tire maker on behalf of their clients.18 The defect
was also known to the similarly-specialized expert consultants that were
the plaintiff’s experts in the bulk of these cases.19 However, over a fiveyear period as the deaths and injuries accumulated, the defect was
apparently not reported to the National Highway Transportation Safety
Authority (NHTSA).20 In addition to receiving higher monetary awards
for a non-disclosure agreement, the attorneys and consultants did not
want to risk NHTSA making a decision that would not support their
present and future clients.21 Dr. Martinez, a trauma physician who
formerly headed NHTSA, is quoted as saying, “[i]t’s outrageous—I can’t
say that enough” and ‘‘[i]f I saw something was killing my patients and
I didn’t say anything because that would reduce the demand for my
services, I would be putting my benefit over the benefit of my patients
and the public, and that would clearly be unethical.’’22 But Geoffrey
Hazard, Jr., a University of Pennsylvania Law School professor reputed
to be an expert on legal ethics, is quoted by Bradsher as saying that
the lawyers had not broken any laws or ethical codes: ‘‘[t]hey had a
civic responsibility the same as you or I do, but they didn’t have a legal
duty.’’23
C.

Metrics of Professional Success

Success in advocacy is a major determinant of success in many, but
not all, of the activities performed by the legal profession, whether
17.

Keith Bradsher, S.U.V. Tire Defects Were Known in ‘96 but Not
Reported, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/
2001/06/24/business/suv-tire-defects-were-known-in-96-but-notreported.html [https://perma.cc/73LX-K9YW].

18.

Id.

19.

Id.

20.

Id.

21.

Id.

22.

Id.

23.

Id. Similarly, attempts to understand the potential impact on human
health of unconventional shale gas drilling have been impeded by the
signature of non-disclosure agreements as part of the settlement
agreement between the shale gas company and those who believe their
health has been affected. One such settlement for $750,000 was disclosed
and widely reported. Sophia Pearson, Range Resources Paid $750,000 in
Fracking
Accord,
BLOOMBERG
NEWS
(Mar.
21,
2013),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-03-21/range-resourcespaid-750-000-in-fracking-accord. A potential impact on scientific
evaluation of a problem of interest to regulatory authorities is that
individuals agreeing to non-disclosure awards, or hoping to obtain a
significant monetary settlement, would not participate in epidemiological
studies thereby lessening the power of such studies to detect any effect.
Bernard D. Goldstein, Flowback, 33 THE ENV’T F. 25-29 (2016).
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through devising successful negotiation strategies or through convincing
judges or juries to provide favorable court decisions. Fictional or actual
depictions of successful advocacy against the odds are well-known to
the public, as well as to the lawyer and to the law student. If accused
of malfeasance I am sure that we all would use effectiveness in advocacy
as a major criterion for choice of a lawyer. Similarly, the major
determinant of success for expert consultants is the ability to help their
clients be successful, irrespective of the rights or wrongs of their
scientific arguments.24
In contrast, in academia or in public scientific organizations the
scientist is continually aware that if their study is to be scientifically
meaningful, or helpful to their career, other scientists must repeat or
attempt to build upon their published study.25 If the findings of other
scientists are not supportive, the academic’s reputation will suffer, as
will their future success.26 Advancement in science in academia as well
24.

Keith A. Spencer, The Art of Scientific Deception: How Corporations Use
“Mercenary Science” to Evade Regulation, SALON (Feb. 2, 2020),
https://www.salon.com/2020/02/02/the-art-of-scientific-deception-howcorporations-use-mercenary-science-to-evade-regulation/
[https://perma.cc/7SCY-3QTD].

25.

For broader discussion of recognition of scientific success, see infra note
27.

26.

Bibliometric approaches that count citation frequency to evaluate the
success of individual scientists have been in use for decades. Journal
Impact Factor was the first and is the simplest. It is defined as the yearly
average number of scientific literature citations published in the last two
years for a specific journal article. Eugene Garfield, The Clarivate
Analytics
Impact
Factor,
CLARIVATE,
https://clarivate.com/
webofsciencegroup/essays/impact-factor/
[https://perma.cc/L6VP8WU8] (originally published in Current Contents, June 20, 1994).
Reflecting the central role of these measures in determining scientific
merit, more complex bibliometric measures continue to be developed. See,
e.g., Jorge E. Hirsch, An Index to Compare Scientific Research Output
Among Similar Scientists, 102 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 1659 (2005). See
also David van Dijk et al., Publication Metrics and Success on the
Academic Job Market, CURRENT BIOLOGY R516, R516 (2014) (using the
National Library of Medicine’s Pub Med to obtain data from over 25,000
published scientists, David van Dijk and his colleagues found that journal
impact factor is more important than total number of publications in
becoming a principal investigator on a grant). See also Charles B. Wright
& Nathan L. Vanderford, What Faculty Hiring Committees Want, 35
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 885, 886 (2017) (As another example, based on
focused interviews of members of hiring committees for faculty in the life
sciences, Charles B. Wright and Nathan L. Vanderford reported that
grant funding and publication history received the highest scores for
recruitment at all faculty levels, and that evidence of national and
international recognition were particularly important at the level of
associate and full professor). The news staff of the journal Nature wrote
an article “Do Metrics Matter” based on a survey of its readers and
selective interviews. In addition to describing the angst about
bibliometrics, they confirmed the major role for publication in high-
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as in government science agencies, is based on an interlocking series of
factors all of which depend heavily upon peer recognition. Success in
publication requires convincing others in their scientific field who are
selected by editors to peer review manuscripts. Having one’s findings
replicated by others will lead to citation. Success in obtaining grants is
dependent upon the judgment of peers who review grant proposals for
funding agencies.27 Also important are indicia of national recognition
such as being chosen to serve on scientific review committees for the
National Academies and for other relevant organizations, including NIH
or NSF grant review committees, and, for an environmental scientist,
being chosen to serve on advisory committees for such organizations as
the EPA, National Science Foundation or National Institute of
Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS).28 At a significant promotion
level, the University Provost or similar decisionmaker often will
additionally solicit letters from scientists in the field who are not
otherwise directly associated with the candidate.29 Academic scientists
fully recognize that those who are reviewing their work or who are
approached for a recommendation about them may well be the ones
ranking journals, citations, and grants. They also quote senior academic
administrators about the importance of external letters. Alison Abbott et
al., Do Metrics Matter?, 465 NATURE 860 (2010).
27.

See How Scientists Are Selected to be Members of a Chartered Review
Group,
NAT’L
INST.
OF
HEALTH
CTR
FOR
SCI.
REV.,
https://public.csr.nih.gov/ForReviewers/BecomeAReviewer/CharteredR
eviewers [https://perma.cc/D3YE-TT9M] (note the statement that
“expertise is the paramount consideration”). For information about NIH
study sections that review grant applications, see Study Sections, NAT’L
INST. OF HEALTH CTR FOR SCI. REV., https://public.csr.nih.gov/
StudySections [https://perma.cc/D3YE-TT9M].

28.

Being chosen to serve on respected scientific committees reflects the
ability to publish in the area of committee concern, just another of the
interlocking metrics of success. See generally NAT’L ACADS., GETTING TO
KNOW
THE
COMMITTEE
PROCESS
(2005),
https://www.nationalacademies.org/_cache_5e69/content/48848857700
00079.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z498-G73T]; see also Harry P. Selker et al.,
CTSA Consortium Consensus Scientific Review Committee (SRC)
Working Group Report on the SRC Processes, 8 CLINICAL AND
TRANSLATIONAL SCI. 623 (2015).

29.

For the importance of external letters in promotions, see, for example,
Robert E. Baker, Tenure and Promotion Guidelines: External Reviewer
Qualification and Selection Process, College of Education and Human
Development, GEO. MASON UNIV. (May, 2020), https://cehd.gmu.edu/
assets/docs/faculty/tenurepromotion/ExternalReviewerQualificationand
SelectionProcess.pdf [https://perma.cc/D97X-DYFW]. Note that the
promotion package is not complete until the dean’s office receives at least
as many letters from outside experts chosen by the dean as it has from
experts recommended by the candidate. Id. Also specified is that these
external experts must be narrowly in the same field as the candidate, thus
highly likely to be aware of the candidate’s stature. Id.
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who have observed their fidelity to the tenets of science while serving
with them on any of these committees, including those for EPA. Based
on these considerations, academic scientists are well aware that getting
the science wrong, or being judged to be other than a dispassionate
scientist, can have significant adverse career consequences.
In contrast, much of the scientific consultant industry who are
specifically hired to support an industry’s desire to lessen the impact of
the EPA’s science-based regulatory activities performs like legal
advocates. Their success is based on their ability to obtain and retain
clients, which in turn is based in large part on the likelihood that they
can devise ways to help their clients counter the scientific basis for
EPA’s unwanted regulatory activities.
Current EPA leadership has turned this distinction between
academic scientists and industry consultants on its head. Based on their
assertion that academic scientists who receive funding from EPA must
be inherently biased in favor of EPA’s regulatory positions, Trump’s
EPA leadership temporarily banned such scientists from serving as
advisors.30 The EPA administrator’s office became more involved in
advisory committee selection processes, with the result that SAB and
CASAC academic scientists were replaced by consultants.31
30.

This was overturned in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency 19cv5174 (DLC) (Feb. 20, 2020). Note
that EPA’s funding of external scientists is through an external peer
review process modeled largely on that of NIH, with the addition of a
scoring by EPA staff for program relevance. Review of EPA’s external
scientific processes by the NAS has generally been highly positive. NAT’L
ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, ENG’G, AND MED., A REVIEW OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY’S SCIENCE TO ACHIEVE RESULTS
RESEARCH PROGRAM 3 (2017).

31.

An analysis by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) compared
the source of SAB committee members at the end of the George W. Bush
administration and two periods during the Obama administration with
that of the Trump Administration. The first three time periods were
remarkably similar in the source of SAB members, including having no
one who came from the consultant industry. But the Trump
administration decreased the number from academia by about a third,
increased the number of industry representatives and chose five
consultants. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-280, EPA
ADVISORY COMMITTEES: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED FOR THE MEMBER
APPOINTMENT PROCESS (2019). See Marianne Lavelle, Trump’s EPA
Skipped Ethics Reviews for Several New Advisers, Government Watchdog
Group
Finds,
INSIDE
CLIMATE
NEWS
(July
26,
2019),
https://insideclimatenews.org/news/16072019/gao-epa-ethics-reviewsscience-advisory-board-industry-consultants-academics-removed-trumppruitt/ [https://perma.cc/DXQ7-C4NZ]; Robyn Wilson, Trump’s EPA
Replaced Scientists with Industry Advisors Under the Guise of ‘Conflicts
of Interest,’ THE HILL (Feb. 25, 2018, 7:30 AM), https://thehill.com/
opinion/energy-environment/375308-trumps-epa-replaced-scientists-withindustry-advisors-under-the [https://perma.cc/BCT4-SFWH].
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D.

The Role of the Literature

A pervasive difference between the practice of science and that of
law is based on how practitioners have been trained to utilize the
relevant literature. Imagine a law student about to participate in a
moot court in which their skills as an advocate will be tested. Also
imagine the student’s roommate, a graduate student in the sciences, is
to present a thesis proposal. Similarities are evident. Both will be
nervous. Their audiences will contain professors and peers whom the
students desire to impress and who may well have some say about their
career trajectory. Both will have been given advice about professional
conduct, ranging from how to organize their presentations to what
clothes to wear. Importantly, both students will have worked hard to
master the broad literature pertinent to their specific presentations,
whether it be relevant judicial decisions or the peer-reviewed scientific
literature. But it is in the presentation of this literature that a
significant difference between the training of the two students will
become clear.
Suppose there is a somewhat obscure published judicial decision
potentially adverse to the position being advocated by the law student.
While our law student must be prepared to provide a counterargument
should this judicial decision be brought up by their opponent, the
student would likely lose points if they were to be the one to first refer
to this decision as their opponent otherwise may not know about or
recognize its relevance. In contrast, our budding scientist faced with the
existence of a similarly obscure peer-reviewed scientific publication that
arguably would refute their thesis, would need to include this
publication in the presentation at the risk of being perceived as
incompetent for not finding the publication, or unethical for not
discussing it.
Senator Edmund Muskie is reputed to have asked for a one-handed
scientist when chairing a Senate hearing at which the head of an NAS
Committee presented with equal emphasis the scientific findings that
on the one hand supported or on the other hand opposed allowing
supersonic transport to fly over the United States.32 While frustrating
to Senator Muskie, the NAS Committee head, in using both hands, was
keeping to the norms of science.
Approaching the scientific literature as something to be
manipulated to support an advocacy position is also at play in the
32.

Ira Flatow, Truth, Deception, and the Myth of the One-Handed Scientist,
THE
HUMANIST
(Dec.
11,
2012),
https://thehumanist.com/
magazine/november-december-2012/features/truth-deception-and-themyth-of-the-one-handed-scientist [https://perma.cc/9TWL-TBBF]. In
teaching potential expert scientific witnesses, I point out that the
standard formulation of “the whole truth and nothing but the truth,” in
a legal proceeding really means the “whole truth and nothing but the
truth as defined by the specific questions asked by the lawyers.”
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proposed “Transparency in Regulatory Science” rule which is discussed
in Section IIIB below.
E.

Going Up Alleys to See if They Are Blind vs. Don’t Ask Questions
Unless You Know the Answer

Scientific research has been characterized as “going up alleys to see
if the alleys are blind.”33 In contrast, lawyers are taught that in a
courtroom it is not wise to ask questions whose answers may be
unforeseen.34
The Trump Administration’s reluctance to ask questions about the
impacts of climate change is well documented.35 One can characterize
some of the attempts of climate deniers as intentionally going up alleys
that are known to be blind.36 This follows the playbook of the tobacco
industry to manufacture doubt.37 Cutting back on climate change
research at the EPA is particularly problematic, as the appropriate
33.

The quote is attributed to Barstow Bates. Research is the Process of
Going Up Alleys to See if They’re Blind, QUOTE INVESTIGATOR,
https://quoteinvestigator.com/2016/03/28/alleys/
[https://perma.cc/WD2U-6MPU].

34.

See e.g., Gerry Oginski, On Cross-Examination at Trial Why Don’t You
Ask a Question If You Don’t Know the Answer to It?, N.Y. MED.
MALPRACTICE
&
ACCIDENT
TRIAL
L.,
https://www.oginskilaw.com/faqs/on-cross-examination-at-trial-why-don-t-you-ask-aquestion-if-you-don-t-know-the-answer-to-it-.cfm
[https://perma.cc/LT5H-ZMUC].

35.

See, e.g., Juliet Ellperin, EPA Now Requires Political Aide’s Sign-off for
Agency Awards, Grant Applications, WASH. POST (Sept. 4, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/epa-now-requires-politicalaides-sign-off-for-agency-awards-grant-applications/2017/09/04/2fd707a0
-88fd-11e7-a94f-3139abce39f5_story.html
[https://perma.cc/9AWCQB8A] (noting that John Konkus, an EPA political appointee, was
reportedly given the job of eliminating EPA funding from all studies
related to climate change).

36.

For example, deniers of a major role for humans claim that climate change
is due to naturally occurring temperature cycles or other ongoing
phenomena related to solar activity which ought to be investigated. See,
e.g.,
INT’L
CLIMATE
SCI.
COALITION,
https://www.climatescienceinternational.org/ [https://perma.cc/FF8GVWWZ]. The goal is to inappropriately manufacture doubt about our
rapidly occurring current anthropogenic climate changes, but the fact is
that global climate change is occurring far too quickly to be due to natural
cycles. See, e.g., How is Today’s Warming Different From the Past?,
NASA
EARTH
OBSERVATORY
(June
3,
2010),
https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/features/GlobalWarming/page3.php
[https://perma.cc/6QPQ-PBXZ].

37.

See infra Section IV for Scott Pruitt’s attempt to develop a red team,
blue team approach to evaluating global climate change. A book that
more generally considers the role of manufacturing doubt is NAOMI
ORESKES & ERIK M. CONWAY, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT, ch. 1 (Bloomsbury
Press 2010).
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focus for the Agency’s research activities should be on answering
questions asked by the public and by policymakers about the personal
and community impacts of climate change, an area that in my view has
not been sufficiently emphasized.38
I discuss below the EPA’s new rule to “Strengthen Transparency
in Regulatory Science” as the misapplication of scientific norms that
are fully appropriate for the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) but
not to the EPA. It could also more cynically be considered as an
attempt to limit the availability of science through not allowing peerreviewed literature to be considered.39
1.

COVID-19 and NAAQS Standards as an Example of Don’t Ask the
Question

More recently, Administrator Wheeler has used the “don’t ask any
questions” approach to avoid considering the role of the COVID-19
pandemic in margin of safety considerations for the new particulate and
ozone standards.40 The NAAQS standard-setting process is a superb
example of incorporating public health concepts into setting
regulations. The formulation in the Clean Air Act is that the standard
should be set to protect public health with an adequate margin of
safety.
Almost uniquely among public health bills, Congress has spelled
out, and the courts affirmed, directions relative to including an
“adequate margin of safety.”41 Congress appears to have been prescient
38.

See Climate Change Research, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/climateresearch [https://perma.cc/GS4V-ZYWU] (detailing EPA’s acceptance of
the role of studying the health and environmental impact of climate
change). See also Bernard D. Goldstein & Michael R. Greenberg, Global
Climate Change and the “So What” Issue: Reversing the Impact of Donald
Trump, 108 AMER. J. PUB. HEALTH S78 (2018); Nick Watts et al., Health
and Climate Change: Policy Responses to Protect Public Health, 386 THE
LANCET 1861 (2015); see generally, Jonathon A. Patz et al., Climate
Change: Challenges and Opportunities for Global Health, 312 J. AMER.
MED. ASSN. 1565 (2014).

39.

See infra Section III.B.

40.

Review of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate
Matter, 85 Fed. Reg. 82,684 (Dec. 18, 2020) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 50); Review of the Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards,
49 Fed. Reg. 49,830 (Aug. 14, 2020) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50).

41.

The term “adequate margin of safety” is used 41 times in EPA’s 65-page
particulate matter standard federal register document. Subsequent cites
are to the specific page in EPA’s Federal Register notice promulgating
standards for particulate matter (see Review of the National Ambient Air
Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 85 Fed. Reg.). The cited pages
also contain citations to key judicial decisions related to the margin of
safety. I quote from EPA’s Federal Register notice as readers
appropriately may question whether I have the background to interpret
court decisions or am interpreting them differently than EPA does. The
language about the margin of safety in the present Federal Register notice

312

Health Matrix·Volume 31·2021
The Vulnerabilities of EPA's Science-Based Regulatory Process

in regards to our current COVID-19 pandemic. It is clearly telling the
Agency to consider whether there are grounds for greater stringency
than just the science that CASAC has considered in its
recommendation. The specific language, as quoted from EPA’s Federal
Register notice for the NAAQS for particulates, is that the margin of
safety should: “address uncertainties associated with inconclusive
scientific and technical information”42 and “provide a reasonable degree
of protection against hazards that research has not yet identified,”43 and
that the EPA administrator should set the margin of safety even if “the
risk is not precisely identified as to nature or degree.”44 Further, the
Congressional language goes beyond just leaving the decision about the
margin of safety to the discretion of the Administrator and specifies
three factors that the Administrator should consider in setting the
margin of safety: “[i]n addressing the requirement for an adequate
margin of safety, the EPA considers such factors as the nature and
severity of the health effects involved, the size of the sensitive
population(s), and the kind and degree of uncertainties.”45
Considering these three factors leads to the following conclusions
about the potential interaction between particulates or ozone and
COVID-19. “Nature and severity” includes death and debilitating
disease. The “size of the sensitive population” is at least in the many
millions. As to “the kind and degree of uncertainties,” we know that
COVID-19 shares with PM 2.5 and ozone having greater effects in those
with pre-existing lung and heart disease., and current evidence points
to COVID-19 causing persistent lung and heart damage, even in

differs little from that of President Reagan’s 1987 particulate standard.
Revisions to the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate
Matter, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,634, at 24,635 (July 1, 1987) (to be codified at
40 C.F.R. pt. 50).
42.

Review of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate
Matter, 85 Fed. Reg. at 82,686, 82,714. The references given at 82,686 is
to Lead Industries Ass’n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
American Petroleum Institute v. Costle, 665 F.2d at 1186; Coalition of
Battery Recyclers Ass’n v. EPA, 604 F.3d 613, 617–18 (D.C. Cir. 2010);
Mississippi v. EPA, 744 F.3d 1334, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 2013). The language
is similar at 82,714 without the references.

43.

Review of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate
Matter, 85 Fed. Reg. at 82,686, 82,714. The two quotes are coupled
similarly at 82,686 and 82,714.

44.

Id. at 82,686. The full quote is “Thus, in selecting primary standards that
include an adequate margin of safety, the Administrator is seeking not
only to prevent pollution levels that have been demonstrated to be
harmful but also to prevent lower pollutant levels that may pose an
unacceptable risk of harm, even if the risk is not precisely identified as to
nature or degree.”

45.

Id. (citing Lead Industries Ass’n, 647 F.2d at 1161–62; Mississippi, 744
F.3d at 1353).
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individuals with milder cases.46 As a physician with experience in
pulmonary medicine, I find it almost inconceivable that a virus which
so viciously attacks the heart and lungs will not make things worse
when combined with present or past exposure to a pollutant that also
attacks the heart and lungs, and vice versa. 47
Further, the job of considering the margin of safety is given to the
Administrator, not to CASAC.48 CASAC made its recommendation
before there was knowledge about the pandemic, but Mr. Wheeler’s
particulate standards were promulgated more than nine months after
President Trump’s declaration of a pandemic.
Mr. Wheeler was asked about COVID-19 in a newspaper interview
and responded by saying that there are uncertainties about the number
of deaths.49 He is right in terms of the level of scientific proof that
46.

For a review of persistent disease following recovery from acute COVID19, see Denyse D. Lutchmansingh, et al., A Clinic Blueprint for PostCoronavirus Disease, 159 CHEST 2021 949 (2021). A study in Belgium
of non-hospitalized patients nine months after the pandemic began showed
persistent respiratory symptoms. Roy Meys et al., Generic and
Respiratory-Specific Quality of Life in Non-Hospitalized Patients with
COVID-19, 9 J. CLINICAL MED. 3993 (2020).

47.

Bernard Goldstein, EPA Must Consider COVID-19 In Setting Air
Pollution
Standards,
THE
HILL
(June
28,
2020),
https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/504908-epa-mustconsider-covid-19-when-setting-air-pollutant-standards
[https://perma.cc/L4KZ-SVYQ]. Note that when this piece was written
in June 2020 there was already sufficient X-ray evidence of lung scarring
to predict longer term effects, so Mr. Wheeler had more than ample time
to take residual lung damage into account in the margin of safety. There
is one mention of COVID-19 – as the reason for closing the EPA public
docket library (at 82,864). Clearly, Mr. Wheeler knows about COVID-19,
as EPA has used it as a rationale to decrease oversight of potentiallypolluting industries (Susan Bodine, Memorandum: COVID-19
Implications for EPA’s Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Program.
March 26, 2020).

48.

Review of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate
Matter, 85 Fed. Reg. at 82,686.

49.

Michel Wilner, At EPA, Coronavirus Disrupts Research and Raises
Questions about Air Quality Impact, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Aug.
9, 2020), https://www.post-gazette.com/news/insight/2020/08/09/AtEPA-coronavirus-disrupts-research-and-raises-questions-over-air-qualityimpact/stories/202008090029 [https://perma.cc/9A5Z-SPP5]; see also
EPA, EPA RESPONSE TO SIGNIFICANT COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSED
NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARD FOR PARTICULATE MATTER
(Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/202012/documents/pm_naaqs_response_to_comments_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7R6B-LXJT] (EPA’s official response to comments it
received about COVID-19 is: “[t]here are many variables related to
COVID-19 health outcomes, and, as COVID-19 is an emerging disease,
there are still many unknowns. Understanding the links between air
pollution exposure and COVID outcomes is a complicated process that
will take many years. The research in this area is new and emerging . . . ”
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CASAC would need when it considers the likelihood of adverse effects
at given pollutant levels.50 But his answer is not at all pertinent to the
rationale for the Clean Air Act requirement that a NAAQS standard
have an adequate margin of safety as described above. He could have
asked EPA scientists, or CASAC,51 or the NAS, or assembled an expert
committee to look at COVID-19 in relation to the margin of safety for
the particulate and ozone standards. But he chose the lawyerly
approach of not asking a question whose answer does not help his
advocacy position.
F.

Other Differences: Temporal Factors, the Choice of Judge and Jury,
and the Admissibility of Evidence

Temporal factors also play a role in the difference between how
lawyers and scientists act. Sheila Jasanoff, in her carefully considered
distinction between regulatory science and research science, has
contrasted the temporal aspects of regulatory deadlines and political
pressures with the open-ended nature of research science.52 A legal
process in a court of law, or an effort in a regulatory agency working to
meet a judicial or Congressional deadline, must be based on information
available at the time the decision is made. In contrast, a scientist
operates with the constant recognition that it is likely the truth
eventually will be known, and that when it is there could be adverse
career consequences if it turns out that the scientist was wrong. It is
the rare scientific paper that does not have a temporizing statement
and “[t]he EPA will consider these new studies for inclusion in the air
quality criteria for the next PM NAAQS review.” The implication of this
statement is that EPA has not read its own FR notice about what it is to
consider in setting the standard).
50.

See Paul J. Villeneuve & Mark S. Goldberg, Methodological
Considerations for Epidemiological Studies of Air Pollution and the SARS
and COVID-19 Coronavirus Outbreaks, 128 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1, 11
(Sept. 2020) (a methodological critique that highly questioned the validity
of then existing published studies that had suggested an association
between COVID-19 and air pollution).

51.

Again quoting the language from the FR notice for the new particulate
standard, EPA notes that beyond advice on the appropriate level for the
standard, CASAC is given other advisory functions by statute including
“(i) advise the Administrator of areas in which additional knowledge is
required to appraise the adequacy and basis of existing, new, or revised
national ambient air quality standards.” Review of the National Ambient
Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 85 Fed. Reg. at 82686. Mr.
Wheeler may not have been willing to bring the issue to CASAC as Mark
Frampton, a pulmonary physician, who would be by far the most
knowledgeable CASAC member about the potential interaction between
COVID-19 and air pollutants, was among the minority of CASAC
members who argued before the pandemic for a more stringent long-term
particulate standard.

52.

THE FIFTH BRANCH, supra note 1, at 82.
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pointing out that more research is needed to confirm the findings.53 This
leads scientists on consensus committees to try to huddle up with other
committee scientists, thus facilitating achieving a consensus opinion.54
Yet another difference which appears to be pertinent to current
EPA leadership’s activities is that opposing counselors routinely
maneuver to have a judicial venue or a judge whose legal philosophy is
consonant with their advocacy position.55 When juries are involved, it
is also the lawyer’s obligation to do their best to pick jury members
whose life experiences and viewpoints will likely be favorable to their
client.56 In contrast, an organization seeking to understand the
consensus position of the scientific community should pick those with
the greatest expertise in the pertinent scientific disciplines. When policy
considerations call for representation of opposing sides, it is the
responsibility of the organization to ensure that balance occurs.
Without such balance, a consensus position that reflects the current
understanding of the scientific community is unlikely. Further, it is
likely that the taint of bias will affect the credibility of the committee’s
recommendations.
Rules of evidence also govern the admissibility of scientific evidence
into court cases. Switching from the Frye to the Daubert tests at the
federal level and in many states, has been accompanied by giving the
judge a larger role in deciding which expert evidence in considered.57
53.

That research leads to further research is sufficiently implicit in the
scientific method that the unqualified statement that more research is
needed has been banned by the British Medical Journal. Fiona Godlee,
More research is needed—but what type?, THEBMJ (Aug. 25, 2010),
https://www.bmj.com/content/341/bmj.c4662
[https://perma.cc/GMN5-G3XV]. In a website aimed at graduate
students, a researcher in New Zealand has said that the phrase more
research is needed “is the final sentiment of an overwhelming proportion
of journal articles, and is repeated so often at academic conferences that
I’ve been tempted to sell it on t-shirts.” Anaise Irvine, More Research is
Needed, THESISLINK (Mar. 29, 2017), https://thesislink.aut.ac.nz/
?p=5179 [https://perma.cc/PX2B-ZDNV].

54.

See supra note 26. Other reasons for moving toward the middle of the
curve include the deference we tend to give to experts in other disciplines
than our own when, as is usual for EPA, the decision is based on science
from multiple disciplines. Further, the deliberative committee approaches
that allow discussion of the science tend to lead to consensus.

55.

For a Supreme Court decision on venue shopping related to patent law,
see TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514
(2017).

56.

Clarence Darrow, How to Pick a Jury, CLARENCE SEWARD DARROW
(1936),
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/DAR_
JURY.HTM [https://perma.cc/3BZ2-UNVK].

57.

See Angelica Cappellino, Daubert vs. Frye: Navigating the Standards of
Admissibility for Expert Testimony, EXPERT INST. (July 24, 2020),
https://www.expertinstitute.com/resources/insights/daubert-vs-fryenavigating-the-standards-of-admissibility-for-expert-
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The earlier Frye test, derived from a Supreme Court decision related to
the validity of lie detectors, was primarily based on considering whether
an expert’s testimony was in keeping with the consensus of the scientific
community.58 In the newer Daubert test, derived from the toxic tort
issue of whether a commonly prescribed “morning sickness” pill was
responsible for fetal abnormalities, the focus switched to whether the
appropriate scientific methodology was used in the scientific literature
on which the expert opinion was based – that is, how the expert got to
the opinion.59 This provides more focus on the individual studies, in
essence leading the judge to be given a much more active role in
deciding whether science is admissible. The recently promulgated
“Transparency in Pivotal Science Underlying Significant Regulatory
Actions and Influential Scientific Information (Transparency Rule),”
with its wide-ranging and poorly-defined authority given to the EPA
Administrator to select or deselect individual studies, can be viewed as
providing a similar gatekeeper role, with the Administrator in the role
of a not-impartial deciding judge.60

II. Organizational and Scientific Issues Related to
the Science/Policy Interface in the EPA
A.

Comparison with Other Federal Agencies: Organizational Issues

Comparing EPA with other science-based regulatory agencies
highlights two issues related to the interface between science and policy
at EPA. One is that the EPA was not founded by an act of Congress.
The second is its inclusion of an in-house scientific organization at an
organizational level equivalent to its policy offices.

testimony/#:~:text=Generally%2C%20the%20difference%20between
%20the,list%20of%20factors%20to%20consider [https://perma.cc/76BNCHAC]; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1999);
and see Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
58.

Frye, 293 F. at 1014.

59.

The Federal Rules of Evidence Section 702, derived from the Daubert
decision and since amended for clarity, states that a qualified expert
witness may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) The
expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b)
The testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) The testimony is
the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) The expert has
reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. FED.
R. EVID. 702. Each of these four components has words or phrases that
can be variously defined and applied (e.g., “reliable,” “sufficient,”
“reliably applied”).

60.

Strengthening Transparency in Pivotal Science Underlying Significant
Regulatory Actions and Influential Scientific Information, 86 Fed. Reg.
470 (Jan. 6, 2021) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 30).
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When it was formed in 1970, the decision that the EPA should have
a scientific arm may well have been based on inertia. To establish the
EPA, President Nixon amalgamated existing components of different
federal agencies.61 When the dust settled, of the 84 sites that were now
the “property” of the new agency, half were laboratory facilities.62
Congress did agree to the EPA’s formation and signaled approval of
the EPA having an in-house science program by funding a new research
facility in Cincinnati.63 But, in contrast to the FDA, the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the Consumer Product
Safety Commission and other similar agencies, the EPA does not have
a founding act that in essence provides it a Congressionally-mandated
mission statement.64
The evidence that this would have been a bad idea, at least until
now, comes from an experiment unintentionally devised by Congress
fifty years ago. The EPA and OSHA were both formed in 1970. The
EPA began with its own R&D program, while OSHA, as part of the
Department of Labor, was established with a separate R&D program
in a different federal agency (The National Institute of Occupational
Safety and Health, which is part of the Centers for Disease Control in
the Department of Health and Human Services).65 Having different
intra-agency, OMB, and congressional oversight and budgetary review
processes, OSHA and NIOSH sometimes do not appear to be wellcoordinated.66 Early in the EPA’s history, the salience of the argument
61.

Special Message from the President to Cong. about Reorganization Plan
No.
3
of
1970
(July
9,
1970)
https://archive.epa.gov/
epa/aboutepa/reorganization-plan-no-3-1970.html
[https://perma.cc/7CCU-DAB5].

62.

Dennis C. Williams, Why Are Our Regional Offices and Labs Located
Where They Are? A Historical Perspective on Siting, EPA HIST. (March
1993),
https://www.epa.gov/history/why-are-our-regional-offices-andlabs-located-where-they-are-historical-perspective-siting
[https://perma.cc/9V7U-XYSB].

63.

Id. Among the founding documents leading to the formation of EPA, I
can find none that specifically raised the question of whether EPA should
have its own science and technology function.

64.

Bernard D. Goldstein, Science and an EPA Mission Statement, 101 ENV’T
HEALTH PERSP. 466–67 (1993).

65.

Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 § 22, 29 U.S.C. 671; About
the Office of Research and Development (ORD), U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/aboutepa/about-office-research-anddevelopment-ord [https://perma.cc/5C35-PX24].

66.

For example, many of OSHA’s enforceable standards are substantially
different from the standards formally recommended by NIOSH. As just
one of many examples, the OSHA enforceable limit for toluene is 200 parts
per million (ppm; 8 hour average), while NIOSH has recommended that
the limit should be 100 ppm (10 hour average). See ToxFAQs for Toluene,
AGENCY FOR
TOXIC
SUBSTANCES AND
DISEASE REGISTRY,
https://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/Toxfaqs/TF.asp?id=160&tid=29
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that the EPA’s science could become biased because of internal political
interference led Congress to direct the formation of scientific advisory
processes which incorporated the external scientific community, notably
the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC) as part of the
1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act, and the upgrading of the
Science Advisory Board (SAB) following passage of the EPA Science
Advisory Board Reform Act of 1978.67 The number of CASAC
committee members were specified, and the committee was given an
important role in the activities leading to the setting of National
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). The SAB reform assured
the committee’s independence in providing advice, including its
involvement in any major EPA scientific issue.68 If these aspects of the
EPA were to be dismantled, it might be worth considering removing
ORD from virtual captivity by the EPA’s political concerns and placing
it within NIEHS, the Centers for Disease Control, or other
governmental organizations.
B.

Comparison with Other Federal Agencies: Scientific Issues

I have chosen to consider the EPA’s new “Transparency Rule,” at
least in part, as a misunderstanding of the applicability to the EPA of
the scientific norms that govern how the FDA makes decisions about
allowing the marketing of clinical interventions. I argue that these FDA
rules are specific to the FDA and not generalizable to the EPA. The
FDA, like the EPA, is a complex organization with different types of
organizations to regulate and a variety of regulatory tools to use. The
FDA has a strong advisory process, with many major decisions being
formally recommended by panels of external scientists with a large
variety of disciplinary expertise.69 One source of confusion, or of
[https://perma.cc/48XB-WE5P]. As EPA Assistant Administrator (AA)
for the Office of Research and Development, I could fully expect to present
my budget proposal for the forthcoming year to the same oversight groups
who would also hear from other EPA AAs who were heading EPA policy
offices. These oversight groups were within EPA, at the White House
Office of Management and Budget, and within Congress. I could be certain
that at every level each of these AAs would be asked whether ORD’s
current and planned activities were supportive of policy office goals. The
coordinating role of oversight processes is less likely to occur when the
organizations report so differently within the federal structure. The
geographical separation between OSHA and NIOSH also precludes the
informal “elevator conversations” that at EPA are effective in
communicating and coordinating science and policy, although OSHA and
NIOSH have worked hard to successfully bridge the distance between
Washington DC and Morgantown, WV.
67.

Environmental
Research,
Development,
and
Demonstration
Authorization Act (ERDDAA). 42 U.S.C. § 4365 (2018).

68.

See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(2) (2018).

69.

The language specifying the expertise that is desired for the core of FDA
Science Advisory Board of 21 voting members lists 19 different areas
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intentional obfuscation,70 has led to the generalization of transparency
processes which are appropriate to one part of FDA’s mission, that of
approving new drugs, but not to EPA’s mission of setting standards to
protect human health.
A longstanding desire of those opposed to the EPA’s use of science
for regulations that affect the fossil fuel industry is to require that the
EPA only rely on studies for which all of the data are available for
anyone to reanalyze.71 This began over twenty years ago and has
proceeded with many iterations and many names, including “secret
science,” “The HONEST Act,” and most recently “Transparency in
Regulatory Science.”72 Wagner has given a good summary of the history
of this endeavor, and has pointed out that it is analogous to efforts
under Daubert to disqualify science in tort proceedings.73
Scientific transparency sounds good. The FDA has led a major push
for transparency in studies presented for regulatory agency decisions.
This makes sense for the FDA. The approach required for investigating
a new therapeutic agent is a randomized double-blind study in which
neither the volunteer patient nor the physician knows whether the

pertinent to FDA. Rakesh Raghuwanshi, Science Board to the Food and
Drug
Administration,
FDA
(Apr.
23,
2019),
https://www.fda.gov/advisory-committees/committees-and-meetingmaterials/science-board-food-and-drug-administration
[https://perma.cc/528F-4NVT].
70.

While likely to be a misunderstanding for many to whom transparency
seems a nominal good, in November 2019, David Michaels and I concluded
that the obfuscation is likely to be intentional on the part of EPA
Administrator Wheeler. See David Michaels & Bernard D. Goldstein, How
EPA Director Andrew Wheeler is Using Scientific Transparency as a
Weapon,
SALON
(Nov.
25,
2019),
https://www.salon.com/
2019/11/24/how-epa-director-andrew-wheeler-is-using-scientifictransparency-as-a-weapon/ [https://perma.cc/L7LA-HU7D].

71.

See infra note 72.

72.

See e.g., Bernard Goldstein, Why the EPA’s Secret Science Proposal
Alarms Public Health Experts, THE CONVERSATION (May 18, 2018),
http://theconversation.com/why-the-epas-secret-science-proposalalarms-public-health-experts-96000
[https://perma.cc/XYN8-BWR4].
See also Strengthening Transparency or Silencing Science? The Future of
Science in EPA Rulemaking: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Sci.,
Space, & Tech., 116th Cong. 47 (2019) (statement of Linda Birnbaum,
former NIEHS Director); GOLDMAN & DOMINICI, supra note 6; Joel
Schwartz, “Transparency” as Mask? The EPA’s Proposed Rule on
Scientific Data, 379 NEW ENG. J. MED 1496, 1497 (2018); particularly
informative is a study showing how little anyone wants the underlying
data for EPA regulations by Lynn R. Goldman & Ellen K. Silbergeld,
Assuring Access to Data for Chemical Evaluations, 121 ENVTL. HEALTH
PERSP. 149 (2013).

73.

WAGNER, supra note 1, at 101–02.
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patient is receiving the drug or the placebo.74 This approach is ethically
justified because the volunteer who suffers from the disease may benefit
if assigned to receive the drug rather than the placebo, but would not
be ethical for comparing the adverse effects of a pollutant with that of
a placebo.75 Further, the circumstances of the drug trial, including the
cost and the proprietary nature of the drug, usually limit major clinical
trials to at most a few relatively expensive large studies funded and
performed under the direction of the company.76 Past experience with
misunderstood or misrepresented drug studies has justified the FDA
and similar agencies in other countries to require complete
transparency, including advanced public notice of the study.77 In
contrast, for environmental health studies only in rare circumstances
can one ethically ask a volunteer to be exposed to a potentially harmful
pollutant to test its toxicity.78
74.

Michael D. Green, et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCI. EVIDENCE 555–56 (National Academies Press 3d ed.,
2011).

75.

Two issues are at play here. It is difficult to imagine that a researcher
could enlist enough volunteers willing to be exposed to a potentially toxic
chemical for a randomized double-blind study to have enough statistical
power to find out if the chemical produces an adverse effect. Secondly, on
ethical grounds, an Institutional Review Board (IRB), whose approval is
required for any human study, would be highly unlikely to approve the
study in the absence of any potential benefit to the volunteer.

76.

The value and challenges of randomized clinical trials are evident to
anyone following news accounts of the development of treatments and
vaccines for COVID-19. For vaccine development from 1998–2009,
Pronker et al. have estimated a market entry success rate of 6% at an
average investment cost of $200-900 million. Esther S. Pronker, et al.,
Risk in Vaccine Research and Development Quantified, 8 PLOS ONE 1
(2013).

77.

To be published in major journals or considered by the FDA, the clinical
trial is required to be posted in advance on an approved transparent web
site available to the public. For the decision by the editors of major
journals not to accept for publication any non-registered manuscript
describing a clinical trial, see Catherine De Angelis et al., Clinical Trial
Registration: A Statement from the International Committee of Medical
Journal Editors. 351 NEW ENG. J. MED., 1250, 1250–51 (2004). For the
NIH clinical trials registry see ClinicalTrials.gov, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. OF
MED., https://www.clinicaltrials.gov/ [https://perma.cc/7UGB-Z2JF]
(providing a database of privately and publicly funded clinical studies
conducted around the world). The background for this development
included the perception that drug companies were selective in the studies
they submitted to the government.

78.

The National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine provide a
brief description of the findings of an NAS Committee asked to review
controlled human exposure studies. See New Report Finds EPA’s
Controlled Human Exposure Studies of Air Pollution Are Warranted,
NAT’L
ACADS.
PRESS
(Mar.
28,
2017),
https://www.nationalacademies.org/news/2017/03/new-report-finds-
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The inherent inability of environmental epidemiology to achieve the
gold standard of a randomized double-blind control trial, the greater
uncertainties related to measuring the exposure of individuals, and the
usual lack of a one-to-one relationship between a pollutant and a
disease79 means that there is a much greater likelihood of some
unforeseen confounding in any one study.80 For example, if a pollutant
increases the extent of asthma attacks in the general population by
twenty percent, this impact may be more than sufficient to trigger EPA
regulation. But asthma attacks have many causes, including different
local sources of pollen, personal stress levels, respiratory infections,
indoor allergens, and other triggers.81 Accordingly, any one study could
be confounded by variations in other causes of asthma. Without
randomization to most effectively control for these potential
confounding factors, the EPA has relied on reviewing the breadth and
depth of all of the relevant studies, using peer review as a valuable first
screen. In essence, there is a web of science that must be evaluated for
informed regulatory decision-making. Not surprisingly, the links in this
web will be of different strength, depending upon the specifics of the
study and its relevance to the decision under consideration.82 EPA’s
epas-controlled-human-exposure-studies-of-air-pollution-are-warranted
[https://perma.cc/MJ8G-ZMPF].
79.

A rare exception to the general rule that pollutants cause effects that have
other causes as well is mesothelioma, which serves as a signature disease
of asbestos exposure. Curtis W. Noonan, Environmental asbestos exposure
and risk of mesothelioma, 5 ANNALS OF TRANSLATIONAL MED. 234 (2017)
(“Asbestos exposure is the only established risk factor known to be
causally related to mesothelioma.”). Another important difference is that
in the drug trial the dose of the agent to the individual is relatively rigidly
controlled. In contrast, studies of exposure to environmental agents often
require extrapolation from indirect measurements, such as regional
pollutant levels, or estimates based on whether a community is upwind or
downwind from an overturned tanker car. See Exposure Assessment Tools
by Approaches – Indirect Estimation, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/
expobox/exposure-assessment-tools-approaches-indirect-estimationscenario-evaluation [https://perma.cc/4YR5-RS8P].

80.

See GREEN, supra note 74, at 563–64.

81.

Common Asthma Triggers, CDC (Aug. 21, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/
asthma/triggers.html [https://perma.cc/QJF3-5L2X].

82.

For example, consider two studies showing a similar positive relation
between summertime ozone levels and emergency room visits for asthma
in different communities. In one study, community pollen levels are
available and the investigators have shown that the pollen levels are
unrelated to asthma incidence. In the second, community pollen counts
are not available. Although a weaker study because it cannot evaluate
pollen as a possible confounder, the second study strengthens the overall
web of science supporting the reported association (e.g., the observed
association between ozone and asthma attacks could have been negative
rather than positive). The concern is that an EPA administrator would
discard the first study and focus on the weakness in the second study.
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revised transparency proposal, allowing the Administrator to pick and
choose among the studies to be considered, raises the possibility of
preferential choice of studies aimed at biasing the outcome.83
In interpreting the web of studies, one must also consider
biological plausibility. The EPA almost uniformly considers biological
plausibility in its scientific analyses underlying regulation.84 For
example, there was much doubt about initial findings of cardiovascular
effects of particulates reported in epidemiological and animal toxicology
studies until mechanistic pathways between lung and heart were
clarified. 85
Perhaps the real goal of the “transparency” proposal is to
sufficiently narrow the number of published papers considered in the
EPA’s scientific analysis so that the technique of discrediting the
opponent’s science by “corpuscularization” can come into play. This
term, coined by Thomas McGarity, refers to the goal of discrediting
every one of the scientific papers used by opposing advocates by finding
at least a small blemish in each, thereby claiming that each paper

83.

The EPA SAB, when it finally was allowed to weigh in on the full
proposal, expressed concern about the definitional issues. Michael
Honeycutt, Subject: Science Advisory Board (SAB) Consideration of the
Scientific and Technical Basis of EPA’s Proposed Rule Titled
Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory Science, OFF. OF THE ADMIN.
SCI. ADVISORY BOARD (Apr. 24, 2020), https://yosemite.epa.gov/
sab/sabproduct.nsf/LookupWebReportsLastMonthBOARD/2DB3986BB
8390B308525855800630FCB/$File/EPA-SAB-20-005.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6NXF-SQEC]. See my discussion of the specific
example of the chemical industry’s attacks on a significant paper
supporting formaldehyde as a cause of human leukemia. Industry obtained
the raw data and hired consultants to find alleged blemishes but never
sought to repeat the study in another exposed population. See Bernard
Goldstein, Presentation to the Joint Hearing of the Subcommittee on
Investigations & Oversight and the Subcommittee on Environment of the
House Committee on Science, Space and Technology, ENV’T PROTECTION
NETWORK
5–6
(Mar.
27,
2019),
https://www.environmental
protectionnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/IRIS-TestimonyMarch-27-2019-Goldstein.pdf; Bernard Goldstein, The HONEST Act is
Actually Dishonest and Will Hurt the EPA, THE HILL (Apr. 20, 2017),
https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/energy-environment/329671-thehonest-act-is-actually-dishonest-and-will-hurt-the
[https://perma.cc/X7LR-JXRL].

84.

Each of the Integrated Scientific Assessments for NAAQS air pollutants
has a section on biological plausibility, as do many other EPA scientific
analyses. See EPA, INTEGRATED SCIENCE ASSESSMENT FOR PARTICULAR
MATTER 17 (2019).

85.

Id. at 6 (discussing the role of PM2.5 in causing cardiovascular effects).
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should be totally disregarded from consideration by the judge or jury,
rather than considered as part of a reinforcing web of science.86
C.

The Status of ORD Within EPA

Under President Trump the status of ORD within the EPA was
degraded. This is the first time that a president failed to nominate
anyone for Senate confirmation as the EPA Assistant Administrator for
Research and Development.87 Having the science arm of the EPA
headed by someone nominated by the President and confirmed by the
Senate puts that individual at the same level as the heads of the
program offices (e.g., Office of Water; Office of Air and Radiation).
Instead, current ORD leadership has a well-respected internal EPA
scientist, Dr. Jennifer Orme-Zavaleta as Principal Deputy Assistant
Administrator and Acting Chief Science Advisor. However,
Administrator Pruitt created a new position, Deputy ORD Assistant
Administrator for Science Policy. Pruitt originally chose Richard
Yamada, PhD, who as an assistant professor had a reasonably wellrespected scientific publication record in applied mathematics and
genetics. Yamada became involved in scientific policy after serving on
the staff of the House Science, Space and Technology Committee.88
Administrator Wheeler replaced Yamada with David Dunlap, a
chemical engineer who has long been involved in environmental
consulting.89 Dunlap’s recent service as director of environmental affairs
86.

See Thomas O. McGarity, Science in the Regulatory Process: On the
Prospect of “Daubertizing” Judicial Review of Risk Assessment, 66 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS 155 (2003).

87.

See How to Rebuild the US Environmental Protection Agency,
NATURE.COM: EDITORIALS (Dec. 16, 2020), https://www.nature.com/
articles/d41586-020-03539-z
[https://perma.cc/586C-A5RZ].
Senate
Republicans blocked President Obama’s choice, Dr. Thomas Burke, to
head ORD. Senate Republicans Threaten to Block Confirmation of EPA
Research
Chief.
SCIENCE
MAG.
(June
2015),
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2015/06/senate-republicans-threatenblock-confirmation-epa-research-chief [https://perma.cc/BH2L-GHLJ].

88.

The committee was chaired by Lamar Smith (R, Texas), a climate denier,
who repetitively led the committee to propose laws related to
transparency and EPA science advisory processes. Michael Hiltzik,
Column: Good Riddance to Rep. Lamar Smith (R-Texas), the Most
Obnoxious Climate Change Denier in Congress. LOS ANGELES TIMES
(Nov. 3, 2017). https://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltziklamar-smith-20171103-story.html
[https://perma.cc/W2H9-3YUD].
Yamada’s activities on this committee presumably led to his choice for
this new ORD Deputy Administrator for Science Policy. Scott Waldman,
Meet the Man Helping EPA to Reshape Science, E&E NEWS (May 23,
2018),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060082467
[https://perma.cc/9B7B-WC2B].

89.

Brandi Buchman, EPA Names Former Koch Industries Figure Chief of
Research,
COURTHOUSE
NEWS
SERV.
(Oct.
1,
2018),
https://www.courthousenews.com/epa-names-former-koch-industries-
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for Koch Industries is not mentioned in his biography on EPA’s
website,90 nor does it appear that he has published in the scientific or
technical literature. Dunlap’s job is described as representing “the
Administrator and Deputy Administrator at various task force, panel,
and committees on science and operational program activities related
to the development of Agency science policies and regulations.”91 In
other words, rather than a scientist or engineer confirmed by the U.S.
Senate, an advocate chosen by the EPA Administrator was the interface
between ORD’s scientific and technical staff and EPA’s regulatory
decision processes.

III. Achieving Scientific Consensus
Frustration by stakeholders at how scientific evidence is
incorporated into legal and regulatory processes, and not just those of
the EPA, has been a virtual constant throughout the EPA’s existence
and has led to proposals for change.92 The following brief review of
consensus processes is aimed at serving as a background to the
discussion of the changes proposed or made by the Trump
administration.
figure-chief-of-research/ [https://perma.cc/LT96-J8EB]; Annie Snider,
Koch Alumnus at EPA Worked on Toxic Chemical Despite Recusal Plan,
POLITICO (Oct. 17, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/
news/2019/10/17/koch-dunlap-epa-formaldehyde-049060
[https://perma.cc/WLH6-W8NW].
90.

Bess Levin, Trump Quietly Planted a Top Koch Official Inside the E.P.A.,
VANITY
FAIR
(Feb.
5,
2019),
https://www.vanityfair.com/
news/2019/02/trump-put-a-koch-official-in-charge-of-americas-drinkingwater [https://perma.cc/7CER-6B7P]. I confirmed Levin’s position that
the lack of mention of Mr. Dunlap’s prior position at Koch Industries is
distinctly unusual. The EPA website provides a list of each of its
Headquarter and Regional Offices; including its leadership at the
Assistant Administrator (AA), Deputy AA or Regional Administrator
levels, with in many cases a link to their biographies. On Dec 31, 2020, I
found 19 biographies of individuals who were not long-term EPA
employees. With the sole exception of Mr. Dunlap, all of these biographies
specified their prior position before coming to EPA. EPA appears to have
omitted Mr. Dunlap’s prior position to obscure the fact that EPA’s
Deputy Administrator for ORD came from an advocacy position at Koch
Industries.

91.

PFAS
Technical
Program, AIR & WASTE MGMT. ASS’N,
https://www.awma.org/pfastechprogram
[https://perma.cc/CU6Y9NKX] (including Dunlap’s EPA biography that has since been removed
from EPA website).

92.

One example of responding to such concerns is an external review of
EPA’s science commissioned by EPA Administrator William Reilly. It
includes a favorable review of CASAC’s activities. U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA 600/9-91/050, SAFEGUARDING THE FUTURE:
CREDIBLE SCIENCE, CREDIBLE DECISIONS (1992).
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Approaches to obtain the considered opinion of the scientific
community vary based upon the goals of the process, the legal
structures in which they take place, the culture of the organizations
involved, and the breadth and depth of the science to be considered. In
2004, Russellyn Carruth and I critiqued the scientific review process
then recently adopted by the World Trade Organization (WTO) to
assist in a WTO Panel deliberation.93 We noted the importance of
determining how to fairly choose the experts for a contentious issue;
pointed out the need to consider the number of experts in relation to
the breadth of disciplines involved; criticized the WTO for hearing from
the experts individually rather than having them discuss the issues
jointly with the WTO panel; and criticized the failure of an iterative
approach which could clarify the uncertainties in dispute resolution.94
We recommended changes to move toward a consensus panel.95 These
are many of the same changes that are needed to repair the damage
inflicted by the Trump administration on the consensus processes
developed through decades of trial and error at EPA. Described below
are a number of consensus processes used by various organizations.
Perhaps most pertinent to mixing law with science was a proposal
for a “Science Court” made almost 50 years ago by Alvin Weinberg. He
noted that many of the science-related issues facing government were,
in his words, “trans-scientific.” He advocated approaching these
difficult problems by borrowing standard legal procedures,96 including
examination and cross-examination of scientists about their findings
and interpretation.
Wendy Wagner, in her 2003 review of various attempts to reform
regulatory science, notes the then-active campaign from those
concerned with “bad science” to implement a “regulatory Daubert”
approach.97 Wagner has pointed out that the Information Quality Act,
the Shelby Amendment, and similar initiatives can be seen as a
backdoor attempt to bring Daubert to administrative agencies.98
Another possible means of improving the delivery of informed
scientific opinion to the law is based on the recognition that, under Rule
93.

Russellyn S. Carruth & Bernard D. Goldstein, The Asbestos Case: A
Comment on the Appointment and Use of Nonpartisan Experts in World
Trade Organization Dispute Resolution Involving Health Risk, 24 RISK
ANALYSIS, 471, 471–81 (2004).

94.

Id.

95.

Id.

96.

See Alvin Weinberg, Science and Trans-Science, 10 MINERVA 209 (1972)
(describing the complexity of issues that Weinberg called trans-science
might today fit under the heading of “wicked problems” such as
sustainability and climate change).

97.

WAGNER, supra note 1, at 66–67.

98.

Id. See supra Section III.B.
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706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a federal court judge has the
authority to bring in their own experts.99 Joe S. Cecil of the Federal
Judicial Center, working with the National Academies of Science and
with the American Association for the Advancement of Science has been
particularly active in advocating for judges to take advantage of this
opportunity. 100 He found that when judges brought in their own
experts, in 56 of 58 instances the courts’ rulings were consistent with
the expert panel’s findings.101 Yet it appears that most judges are not
comfortable with bringing in their own experts, and I am not aware of
a rush to do so.102
From 1977–2013 the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) held
consensus development conferences primarily on controversial topics
relevant to clinical decision-making.103 The topics were often of
particular interest to government agencies who needed to decide
whether to pay for a specific treatment.104 An Institute of Medicine
review of the NIH Consensus Development conference program was
generally positive.105 However, Itzhak Jacoby, who was an advocate of
using science courts for difficult regulatory decisions, and was involved
in the development of the NIH Consensus Conference program, became
99.

Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer, in an introductory chapter to the
Federal Judicial Center’s Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence,
provides an insightful overview of the issues facing judges in making
decisions in the face of conflicting scientific experts. He is cautiously
positive about judicial appointment of experts to serve the court. Stephen
Breyer, Introduction, in NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, REFERENCE MANUAL ON
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 7–9 (3rd ed. 2011).

100. Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Accepting Daubert’s Invitation:
Defining a Role for Court-Appointed Experts in Assessing Scientific
Validity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995, 995 (1994).
101. Id. at 1041.
102. For why judges are uncomfortable choosing their own experts, see JOE S.
CECIL & THOMAS E. WILLGING, COURT-APPOINTED EXPERTS: DEFINING
THE ROLE OF EXPERTS APPOINTED UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE
706, 4–5 (1993).
103. For an overview of this program when it was active, see COUNCIL ON
HEALTH CARE TECH. INST. OF MED., MED. TECH. ASSESSMENT DIRECTORY
(1988),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK218312/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK
218312.pdf [https://perma.cc/VT9Q-U4US].
104. Retirement of the National Institutes of Health Consensus Development
Program, NAT’L INST. HEALTH, https://consensus.nih.gov/ (stating that
the reason for discontinuation of these conferences was that they were
created during a time when few other organizations were providing
evidence reviews. But that there were now “many other organizations that
conduct such reviews, including other federal agencies, academic
institutions, and private organizations.”).
105. CONSENSUS DEVELOPMENT AT THE NIH: IMPROVING THE PROGRAM, COMM.
OF INST. OF MED. COUNCIL ON HEALTH CARE TECH. 3 (1990).
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disillusioned and criticized the NIH program because it was
insufficiently confrontational and did not include cross-examination of
the expert witnesses.106
A somewhat bizarre example of an attempt to modify the consensus
processes of science by building on a procedural approach useful in
another context, but irrelevant to the EPA, was Scott Pruitt’s advocacy
of the “Red Team, Blue Team” approach to test the validity of global
climate change. Originally developed by the military and now heavily
used in cybersecurity, the red team is charged with testing the potential
limitations of the defenses of an entity while the blue team evaluates
the ability of the entity to stop, or at least limit, the effectiveness of
the attack secretly chosen by the blue team.107 As envisioned by Pruitt,
the public debate would give equal credence to climate deniers, who
represent a very small percentage of the scientific community.108 John
Kelly, a former Marine Corps General who was then Trump’s White
House Chief of Staff, put an end to this proposal.109

106. See Itzhak Jacoby, Consensus Development at NIH: What Went Wrong,
4 RISK 133 (1993); see generally Itzhak Jacoby, The Consensus
Development Program of the National Institutes of Health, 1(2) INT’L J.
TECH. ASSESSMENT IN HEALTH CARE 419, 420 (1985) (describing the
creation of the Consensus Development Program). An earlier review was
positive about process changes that had been made by the NIH to achieve
consensus but raised continuing concerns about selection of questions and
panelists. See generally Paul M. Wortman et al., Do Consensus
Conferences Work? A Process Evaluation of the NIH Consensus
Development Program, 13 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L., 469 (1988).
107. For example, Microsoft has red teams of hackers and blue teams of those
whose goal is to find and shore up potential vulnerabilities to hacking.
Kris Evans, Red vs Blue. Inside the World of the Elite Hacker and Those
Trying to Stop Him, MICROSOFT INDUSTRY BLOGS – U.K. (May 17, 2016),
https://cloudblogs.microsoft.com/industry-blog/en-gb/financialservices/2016/05/17/red-vs-blue/ [https://perma.cc/FP2M-DBC8].
108. See Naomi Oreskes, Scientific Consensus on Climate Change, 306 SCIENCE
1686 (Dec. 3, 2004); see also Vital Signs of the Planet, NASA GLOB.
CLIMATE CHANGE (2019), https://climate.nasa.gov/scientific-consensus/
[https://perma.cc/MV54-MBAJ] (2019 statement by the US National
Aeronautic and Space Administration that 97% of climate scientists agree
that anthropogenic global climate change is occurring).
109. Lisa Friedman & Julie Hirschfeld Davis. The E.P.A. Chief Wanted a
Climate Science Debate. Trump’s Chief of Staff Stopped Him, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/09/climate/pruittred-team-climate-debate-kelly.html [https://perma.cc/49AU-9TY6]. It
appears that Administrator Weaver, who was Deputy Administrator
under Pruitt, seemed to believe that the double-blind studies performed
at FDA are equivalent to a red team, blue team debate. Bernard
Goldstein, How EPA Administrator Completely Misinterprets Science,
THE HILL (June 20, 2019), https://thehill.com/opinion/energyenvironment/449465-how-epa-administrator-wheeler-completelymisinterprets-science [https://perma.cc/S85L-XCRL].
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Perhaps the most recognized and copied consensus approach
globally is that of the U.S. National Academies of Science (NAS). The
NAS has been heavily involved in providing committees, workshops,
roundtables, or other activities, often specified by Congress, that have
reviewed and facilitated EPA activities.110
Central to the internal NAS process is selection of committee
members whose expertise covers the breadth of the charge to the
committee.111 The NAS staff solicits nominations and carefully reviews
the applicants. 112 The potential for bias, or the appearance of bias, is
of primary concern, including previous opinions of the candidate on the
subject matter before the committee, and sources of funding that may
be interpreted by others as bias.113 For obvious reasons, the absence of
a taint of bias is particularly necessary for the choice of Committee
chair. On certain subjects, the NAS may occasionally decide that it
would be best to balance the committee composition in terms of
potential bias, such as by including both a scientist working for an
environmental group and another for industry, but all members are
abjured from approaching the topic as a representative of an
organization.114 Before being publicly released, the draft committee
report is carefully scrutinized within NAS and by external reviewers
chosen by NAS from its elected members.115
The Health Effects Institute (HEI) provides an example that is
particularly pertinent to the issue of the credibility of EPA’s air
pollution health effects research. It was formed in 1980 in response to
controversies concerning the scientific basis for EPA’s NAAQS
standards.116 HEI is a non-profit organization with an independent
Board of Directors. For its core activities, it is funded equally by the

110. Insertion of Environmental Protection Agency into the search engine of
the National Academies Press finds 3,496 publications resulting from NAS
activities. See Search Results for EPA, THE NAT’L ACADS.,
https://www.nap.edu/search/?rpp=20&ft=1&term=EPA
[https://perma.cc/3UBU-7XPG] (last visited Feb. 18, 2021).
111. The processes are described in National Academies of Science, Engineering
and
Medicine.
See
Our
Study
Process,
NAT’L ACADS.,
https://www.nationalacademies.org/about/our-study-process
[https://perma.cc/QTG2-MYMZ].
112. Id.
113. Id. See generally, Conflict of Interest Policies and Procedures, NAT’L
ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G AND MED., https://www.nationalacademies.org/
about/institutionai-policies-and-procedures/conflict-of-interest-policiesand-procedures [https://perma.cc/9ZPL-PSQT].
114. NAT’L ACADS., supra note 28, at 6.
115. See generally NAT’L ACADS., supra note 111.
116. Terry J. Keating, Lessons from the Recent History of the Health Effects
Institute, 26 SCI., TECH. & HUM. VALUES 409 (2001).
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EPA and the automotive industry.117 Neither the EPA nor industry
participates in the choice of the Board or of the members of HEI’s
Research or Review Committees. The members of the Research
Committee, who select the research proposals to be funded, are chosen
and make their decisions based on processes similar to those of NIH,
and the members of the Review Committee, who provide a written
critical review of each of the completed projects, are chosen and make
their decisions using processes similar to those of NAS. 118 HEI has been
favorably reviewed by social scientists as an example of a successful
boundary organization, one that is accountable to two adversarial
organizations.119
A.

What Changed Under the Trump Administration?

Previously, the EPA’s processes for CASAC, SAB, and many other
external scientific advisory committees generally adhered to the
processes of NAS. A synopsis of what was changed at the EPA under
the Trump Administration includes:
(1) The committee selection process moved from being primarily
performed by professional EPA staff, who focused on the needed
expertise, to a process dominated by the Administrator and other
EPA political appointees.120 One requirement created by Mr.
Pruitt was that CASAC have an increased number of individuals
working for state or local agencies rather than the one such
individual required by Congress.121 Unlikely to be coincidental, of
117. For a fuller description of the organization see About HEIs, HEALTH
EFFECTS
INST.,
https://www.healtheffects.org/about
[https://perma.cc/PQ83-FBYB].
118. Conflicts of Interest Policies, HEALTH EFFECTS INST. (Nov. 2017),
https://www.healtheffects.org/about/conflict-of-interest-policies
[https://perma.cc/HQW4-8D9Q.
119. See David Guston, Boundary Organizations in Environmental Policy and
Science: An Introduction, 26 SCI., TECH. & HUMAN VALUES 399, 403
(2001); see also THE FIFTH BRANCH, supra note 1, at 209–16. Its
reputation for scientific objectivity has led HEI to be asked to develop
approaches to contentious scientific issues, such as the potential adverse
health impact of unconventional shale gas drilling, which it has done
through developing an affiliated organization. See HEI-Energy, HEALTH
EFFECTS
INST.,
https://www.healtheffects.org/unconventional-oilnatural-gas [https://perma.cc/L74J-QXJ8].
120. Christopher S. Zarba, The Assault Against Science Continues at the EPA,
N. Y. TIMES
(Nov.
24,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/11/14/opinion/environment-trump-epa-science.html
[https://perma.cc/JA5B-8Q7E].
121. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(2) specifies that
of the total seven members, one should be a member of the National
Academy of Sciences, one should be a physician, and one person should
represent state air pollution control agencies. As CASAC also opines on
the secondary NAAQS standards aimed mostly at protecting ecosystems,
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the seven current CASAC members, the four from state or local
agencies all worked in organizations that reported to Republican
administrations.
(2) The choice of the chair of CASAC, Louis Anthony Cox, is a
recognized consultant statistician who has what, at best, might
be called a minority view of the use of epidemiological evidence
for causation in public health matters.122 He is a consultant for
the fossil fuel industry and has expressed his opinion supporting
the industry on key issues related to health effects of air
pollutants, including a Wall Street Journal opinion piece.123 In my
opinion, for him to chair CASAC clearly violated the norm for
any scientific consensus committee.124
(3) A primary issue for assembling a consensus committee is that
all disciplines relevant to interpreting the pertinent science be
represented. Despite epidemiology being the central discipline for
interpreting the data relevant to standard setting for most air
pollutants, no one with primary expertise in epidemiology was
chosen for the seven-member CASAC committee. Wheeler is
quoted as saying that the group of CASAC members had “a
diverse set of skills in fields like toxicology, engineering, medicine,
ecology and atmospheric science.” Epidemiology is notably absent
from this list. 125

it has become traditional that an ecologist is one of the seven CASAC
members. To the best of my recollection there previously has never been
more than one member from a state or local agency. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7409(d)(2) (2018).
122. John Balmes, Don’t Let a Killer Pollutant Loose, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/14/opinion/air-pollutiontrump.html?partner=IFTTT
[https://perma.cc/BC6N-Q2DD];
GOLDMAN & DOMINICI, supra note 6.
123. Tony Cox, The EPA’s Next Economic Chokehold, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 1,
2015, 7:19 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-epas-next-bigeconomic-chokehold-1441149571 [https://perma.cc/G943-PQEE].
124. This opinion is based on my experience chairing CASAC and about a
dozen NAS committees, many requested by the EPA. I have chaired other
EPA and federal, state and local scientific consensus committees, as well
as for the Health Effects Institute, the World Health Organization, the
United Nations Environmental Program and the Scientific Committee on
Problems of the Environment.
125. Dino Grandoni & Juliet Elperin, EPA Scraps Pair of Air Pollution Panels,
WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/energyenvironment/2018/10/14/epa-scraps-pair-air-pollution-science-panels/
[https://perma.cc/X4PB-5HJM]. The only medical professional on
CASAC is Mark Frampton, MD, a pulmonary physician who would be
expected to have at least modest training and working experience in
epidemiology. He submitted a minority opinion arguing that the evidence
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(4) Because there is such a breadth of disciplines involved in
evaluating the health effects of NAAQS pollutants, it has long
been recognized that pollutant-specific CASAC subcommittees
are also needed.126 The particulate subcommittee had already
begun its deliberations when it was peremptorily fired and plans
for the ozone subcommittee were aborted.127
(5) After receiving much criticism about the discharge of the
subcommittees from CASAC members and others, the
Administrator’s office chose individual external scientists to, in
essence, be made available for CASAC members to question –
once again without a deliberative process.128

required a more stringent annual particulate standard rather than EPA’s
proposal to retain the existing standard.
126. I served on two such subcommittees in the early 1980s. These
subcommittees have tended to increase in size, due to the increasing
number and breadth of relevant published papers and due to advances in
environmental epidemiology and in exposure science.
127. Id at 126. EPA’s rationale was the need to speed up the NAAQS review
process to meet the five year statutory deadline. See Memorandum from
E. Scott Pruitt, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
to Assistant Administrators; Back-to-Basics Processes for Reviewing
National Ambient Air Quality Standards, U.S. ENV’TL PROT. AGENCY
(May
9,
2018)
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201805/documents/image2018-05-09-173219.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ES5VHXGU]. This is specious. If that were the true reason then it would make
sense to begin with the health-based standard that was most out of date,
that
of
carbon
monoxide.
See
NAAQS
Table,
EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/criteria-air-pollutants/naaqs-table
[https://perma.cc/JA33-Z7B8]. My conclusion is that the reason Mr.
Pruitt and Mr. Wheeler began with ozone and particulates and short
circuited the process is that these were the two NAAQS pollutants for
which accumulating science frightened the fossil fuel industry into
believing that the standards might be made more stringent unless acted
on in the first term of the Trump Administration. See also Gretchen
Goldman, et al., We Put Science Back into EPA Air Pollution Standards,
But . . . ,
SCI.
AM.:
OBSERVATIONS
(Apr.
15,
2020),
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/we-put-science-backinto-epa-air-pollution-standards-but/ [https://perma.cc/NE5R-MDJC].
The particulate standard subcommittee continued to meet on their own
and, in contrast to CASAC, recommended more stringent standards.
Independent Particulate Review Panel, The Need for a Tighter
Particulate Matter Air Quality Standard. 360NEW ENGL. J. MEDICINE 680683 (Aug. 13, 2020).
128. For a succinct overview of the many changes made in the CASAC process
see H. Christopher Frey, A Rush to Judgment: The Trump Administration
is Taking Science Out of Air Quality Standards, THE CONVERSATION (as
A comprehensive review can be found in a letter to the Chair of Casac:
H. Christopher Frey, et al. Letter to CASAC from former members of
2009–2014 CASAC Ozone Review Panel, Nov. 26, 2018,
https://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/
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(6) The SAB was not consulted about the wisdom of excluding
scientists who receive EPA grants from advisory processes, or
issues related to changing the CASAC processes described above.
(7) For the proposed transparency rule, EPA leadership initially
only gave SAB the task of recommending a way to deal with
technical issues related to meeting personal privacy concerns.129
They did not ask SAB for advice on whether the proposal was a
good idea, or even whether there was a problem requiring this
drastic new approach. This is equivalent to treating SAB as a
mechanic whose job is to fix a flat tire, but not asking for advice
on whether this was the appropriate destination or the route to
be traveling.130
(8) The SAB did hold a hearing after the EPA published a
Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Transparency
in Regulatory Science. The SAB pointed out numerous problems
that needed to be corrected, including lack of clear definitions of
terms.131
(9) EPA’s transparency proposal alters the selection of scientific
studies to be considered in ways that remain unclear and appears

sabproduct.nsf/0AC9E8672B0CA54985258351005BE54F/$File/Ozone+L
etter+181126+Submitted-rev2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J6PX-BXBZ].
Gretchen Goldman, et al., We Put Science Back into EPA Air Pollution
Standards, But . . . , SCI. AM.: OBSERVATIONS (Apr. 15, 2020), See also H.
Christopher Frey, EPA decides to reject the latest science, endanger
public health and ignore the law by keeping an outdated fine particle air
pollution
standard,
THE
CONVERSATION
(May
1,
2020),
https://theconversation.com/epa-decides-to-reject-the-latest-scienceendanger-public-health-and-ignore-the-law-by-keeping-an-outdated-fineparticle-air-pollution-standard-136226 [https://perma.cc/YH49-AFG3].
129. The subject line from the letter of Sept. 30, 2019 from Michael Honeycutt,
Chair of SAB to Andrew Wheeler clearly states the narrow subject.
Michael Honeycutt, Subject: Consultation on Mechanisms for Secure
Access to Personally Identifying Information (PII) and Confidential
Business Information (CBI) Under the Proposed Rule, Strengthening
Transparency in Regulatory Science, OFF. OF THE ADMIN. SCI. ADVISORY
BOARD (Sept. 30, 2019), https://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/
41042C652229CA398525848500595458/$File/EPA-SAB-19-005.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X2EG-Z4XF].
130. See Wendy E. Wagner & Rena Steinzor, A Real, Not Faux, Transparency
Proposal for Regulatory Science, THE REG. REV. (July 31, 2018),
https://www.theregreview.org/2018/07/31/wagner-steinzor-real-notfaux-transparency-proposal/ [https://perma.cc/Z6M8-ZWXH] (pointing
out the lack of a problem statement as a central failing for all of the EPA
proposed changes in their advisory processes).
131. Honeycutt, supra note 83.
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to provide the Administrator, as the judge, with a major role in
deciding which studies are applicable to the regulatory issue.132
(10) At their meeting concerning the data privacy issues in the
transparency proposal, much to the evident surprise of the SAB
members, SAB members were told to put their individual
comments in writing and submit them to EPA with no further
committee deliberations. This approach allows supporters of
EPA’s transparency proposal to pick and choose from among
these individual comments, which again is contradictory to a
deliberative consensus process.133 But it would be in keeping with
a lawyer summing up their case in front of a judge or jury.

The transparency proposal provides another particularly glaring
example of the failure to ask a question – in this case whether the
proposal can feasibly be carried out. Proponents of the approach
embodied in EPA’s proposal have had many years to find out whether
anyone but industry and their consultants would turn over their
working data to the EPA.
Before a study involving human subjects can be performed it must
be approved by the organization’s Institutional Review Board (IRB).
For any already published study, or a new study for which it was
considered likely that the data would be pertinent to EPA’s regulatory
activities, the investigators would need to get approval from the IRB
to release the data to EPA.
Briefly, the key unanswered questions are:134
132. See discussion of Daubert rule infra Part II.F.
133. The Chair of the SAB, Michael Honeycutt, in the first sentence of the
third paragraph of his September 30, 2019 letter to Andrew Wheeler
summarizing the SAB response, pointedly states “No consensus report is
provided to the EPA because no consensus advice is given.” Honeycutt,
supra note 129.
134. The data, in italics, come from my sampling of references cited by EPA
in its own cardiovascular health effects chapter of the Particulate Matter
Integrated Scientific Assessment. The standard way of deciding what
influences a decision in both science and law is to look at the references
cited. Even under the vague definitions given by EPA, pivotal science
would be cited by EPA in scientific documents underpinning decisions. I
sampled the 34-page reference section of Chapter 6, Cardiovascular
Effects, of the Integrated Scientific Assessment for Particulate Matter in
EPA, INTEGRATED SCIENCE ASSESSMENT FOR PARTICULAR MATTER 331–
344 (2019). The sample was randomized by choosing to review the first
and last reference on each page – in essence randomization by page break.
This provided 68 references. I excluded seven studies for which the data
were likely to be already available to the EPA as they were by EPA
investigators, or were multi-author reviews with no new data by
organizations (e.g., American Heart Association), and an HEI Review
Committee report - which left 61 studies. In considering the number of
institutions that might be involved in permitting the data to be shared, I
lumped together multiple institutions of the same organization, e.g., a
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(1) Would the author or co-authors of EPA-relevant papers want
to turn over their data?
(2) If so, would the IRB require unanimous consent of all coauthors? (average number of co-authors per paper cited by EPA
in my sample was 9.9).
(3) To protect itself from potential scandal which could harm its
ability to recruit subjects for any clinical studies, would the
institution in which the study was performed insist on making its
own rules related to turning over study data?
(4) What about the large majority of studies with multiple
institutions involved? (average of 4.2 institutions per paper in my
sample). Would they all need to agree? Would each IRB or
institution have their own rules?
(5) Who would pay for any de-identification required by IRB or
institutional rules?
(6) Would IRBs refuse to consider turning data over to EPA
because of environmental justice issues? IRBs have the power to
disapprove activities that inherently can have a biased
outcome.135 Would the fact that industry has more money to
reanalyze studies than does a potentially affected disadvantaged
community convince IRBs not to permit the data to be turned
over to EPA?
(7) In my sample of EPA-referenced publications, a large
percentage of EPA’s cited references came from countries outside
of the U.S. (Only 26 of the 61 papers were solely from the U.S.;
17 had U.S. and non-U.S. institutions listed for their authors; and
18 had solely non-U.S. institutions). In many countries, including
particularly in the EU, there are more stringent privacy rules than
in the U.S. – and California is now more stringent than the rest
of the U.S. Will this pose difficulties in obtaining the data for
secondary analyses required in EPA’s proposal?136 Would nonstudy that had authors from the Harvard School of Public Health,
Harvard Medical School and a Harvard-affiliated hospital were counted
as just one organization rather than three.
135. For example, a study comparing performance on a standardized
intelligence test of males versus females in which one gender was
disproportionately selected from community colleges and the other from
Ivy League universities.
136. Deven McGraw, a private industry lawyer, speaking at a 2019 NAS
Workshop on “Virtual Clinical Trials”; Alper et al., Virtual Clinical
Trials, NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI. 51 (2019), https://www.nap.edu/
catalog/25502/virtual-clinical-trials-challenges-and-opportunitiesproceedings-of-a-workshop [https://perma.cc/S72P-KNSC], was quoted
by the NAS Workshop rapporteurs as stating that new developments in
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U.S. scientists agree to subject themselves to potentially hostile
re-analysis when this is not required by their own country to base
its regulatory decisions? When there are scientists from multiple
institutions involved, it is not unusual for IRBs to defer to those
from other reputable locations. Would EU IRBs be willing to
defer to the U.S., or California IRBs to other states?
(8) What about HEI Review Committee products which EPA is
partially funding?137 Would the reviewers be restricted in their
influential analyses to cite only to studies for which raw data were
available? If not, then how can EPA continue to cite these HEI
analyses in their regulatory documents?
(9) Am I right in believing there are few if any academic scientists
who, even if sympathetic to the idea of transparency in
considering scientific issues among their colleagues, would
welcome what is highly likely to be hostile industry consultant
reanalysis that will just divert the academic scientist’s time in
having to respond? 138

privacy laws, such as in California and the EU “set a higher bar for data
to be ‘de-identified,’” and that this is particularly of concern “for onward
secondary uses, such as replication of results and reanalysis.” (emphasis
added). Note my careful language in ascribing this quote to the NAS
workshop rapporteurs. Misleadingly, EPA in its Supplemental Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking on Scientific Transparency repetitively cited out of
context language from an NAS Workshop on Principles and Obstacles for
Sharing Data from Environmental Health Research, Workshop Summary
that made it seem as if their proposed approach had NAS support. In
contrast to committee reports, NAS workshop reports routinely contain a
disclaimer that the information within the document represent individual
opinions “and are not necessarily endorsed or verified by the (NAS) and
should not be construed as reflecting any group consensus”. (See Bernard
D. Goldstein; Comments on Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
on Science Transparency; Docket # EPA-HQ-OA-2018-0259; May 18,
2020,
https://www.environmentalprotectionnetwork.org/wp-content/
uploads/2020/05/Comments-on-Supplementary-Notice-of-ProposedRulemaking-on-Science-Transparency-Final.docx-2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P2VT-QP93]). The failure to attribute the quotes from
the NAS workshop to Lynn Goldman was further evidence that EPA was
being intentionally misleading as Goldman had been emphatic in her
opposition to the transparency in science initiative, including testimony
to the SAB and a publication in a scientific journal. GOLDMAN &
SILBERGELD, supra note 72.
137. For description of HEI and its relation to EPA, see supra notes 119–21.
138. EPA avoided providing an estimate of how many existing studies would
fall under its requirement for full disclosure of underlying data and models
to be considered in rule-making. Perhaps indicative of the intended impact
is a statement in the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) analysis of the
failed congressional bill, the HONEST Act of 2017, on which the EPA
transparency proposal was based. “EPA officials have explained to CBO
that . . . [their] approach to implementing the legislation would
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There is an obvious approach to answering these questions. Just
ask. Survey the scientific community. Ask the SAB for a thorough
analysis. Or the questions could have been posed to IRB directors, or
VPs for Research at major universities,139 or to samples of experts in
the scientific community contributing to EPA’s decision making.
Notably, these questions should have been posed to the NAS, which
has been particularly active on data privacy issues. Putting “Date
Privacy” into the National Academy Press search engine came up with
723 titles.
A final question: will the web of environmental health science
underlying the EPA’s regulations be destroyed because almost no peerreviewed studies will be available for analysis?

Conclusion
Thanks largely to the election results and to the probing questions
of Case Western reviewers and the comments of colleagues, I greatly
revised the conclusions of this paper to focus on where to go from here.
From the beginning of the Trump administration it has been clear that
the scientific basis of EPA’s many positive environmental achievements
were at risk. 140 These fears were not understated. Some of what I
describe is the bending or breaking of the laws mandating the
involvement of CASAC and the SAB in facilitating a robust scientific
basis for EPA’s regulatory activities. To the extent that they are not
changed by the incoming Biden Administration, the staying power of
many but not all of the alterations will depend on court decisions.
But I believe more important than arguably violating the law, the
EPA under the Trump administration has changed the norms that have
evolved at the EPA in the last half century. As just one example,
allowing a consensus committee considering a controversial issue to be
chaired by a known advocate of one extreme is not specifically forbidden
by the laws establishing EPA advisory processes. Nor am I aware that
significantly reduce the number of studies that the agency relies on when
issuing or proposing covered actions for the first few years following
enactment of the legislation.” U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFF., COST EST.: H.R.
1430, HONEST AND OPEN NEW EPA SCIENCE TREATMENT (HONEST) ACT
OF 2017 (2017).
139. I cannot imagine that my university’s Vice Chancellor for Research, with
$500 million of annual NIH funding, would risk an inadvertent disclosure
event that could decrease the likelihood of patients volunteering for future
clinical research (nor would reassurance of an infallible confidentiality
process from either the University of Pittsburgh faculty member or a U.S.
government agency likely affect the Vice Chancellor’s decision).
140. Jonathan M. Samet et al., The Trump Administration and the
Environment – Heed the Science, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED 1182–83, 1186
(2017); David Guston et. al., Endangering the Health of All: Destroying a
Half Century of Health Leadership Along With America’s Environment,
110 AMER. J. PUB. HEALTH 284–85 (2020).
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the value of having an unbiased CASAC chair has been considered in
judicial reviews. But, along with many other of the changes, it is a norm
that is central to eliciting the consensus position of the scientific
community.
I began this paper with a description of the norms governing
neighborhood basketball. Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, in their
book “How Democracies Die,” point out examples of where democracies
have failed despite having seemingly appropriate constitutional
protections, a failing which they attribute to the loss of policy norms.
Their prescient New York Times op ed written after the election but
before Trump took office, contains a similar use of street basketball as
a metaphor: “[l]ike a pickup basketball game without a referee,
democracies work best when unwritten rules of the game, known and
respected by all players, ensure a minimum of civility and cooperation.
Norms serve as the soft guardrails of democracy, preventing political
competition from spiraling into a chaotic, no-holds-barred conflict.”141
Norms also serve as the guardrails protecting the scientific basis of
EPA’s regulations. But EPA leadership under Donald Trump has
taught us that these guardrails need strengthening. One approach
would be by adding adherence to consensus processes to the laws
governing EPA’s advisory committees. Just as lessons learned from the
Trump administration may lead to developments of further laws
governing transition of Executive Branch power, the public availability
of candidates’ tax information, or the process for confirming Supreme
Court Justices, the norms governing scientific consensus processes can
be further codified. For example, to the specific Congressional language
in the Clean Air Act about the composition of CASAC could be added
statements that the Chair of CASAC must be free of the taint of bias.
Such language conceivably would have prevented the choice of the chair
chosen by Administrator Pruitt, or at least given greater weight to the
court arguments of those looking to overturn the recent particulate and
ozone NAAQS standards. Amendments to ERDAA could state that the
choice of EPA’s external advisory committee members and their
deliberative processes should generally conform to the consensus
processes used by the National Academies of Science or similar
organizations.
Note that I have chosen my words carefully to avoid asking for
imposition of a one-size-fits-all legal requirement for achieving scientific
consensus. What I hope for is congressional language and judicial
141. Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt, Is Donald Trump a Threat to
Democracy?, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/12/16/opinion/sunday/is-donald-trump-a-threat-todemocracy.html [https://perma.cc/245G-MBK3]. The authors have
expanded on their thesis in a book describing how democratic governance
has been lost in various countries around the world. Science is hardly
mentioned. See generally STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW
DEMOCRACIES DIE (2018).
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decisions that strongly inhibit the substitution of advocacy for
consensus, that facilitate the use of processes that achieve the strong
scientific base needed by EPA, and other science-based regulatory
agencies, to achieve the mission given them by the American public.
The standard governmental approach to scientific issues that are
unfamiliar to most elected leaders is to establish a commission that
would report their findings and recommendations. This would be
welcome, as would asking the NAS to look at the issue. Ideally this
commission would be asked for by Congress to whom its report would
be given. At the least, it should be established by the new EPA
leadership as an early signal to the internal and external environmental
science communities of their recognition of the importance of the issue.
EPA can of course do much internally to change how science has
been distorted, such as restoring previous processes for the selection of
advisory committee members and their deliberation.
Another way for the new administration to signal their intention to
restore EPA’s scientific norms will be to give priority to the early
nomination of a highly respected scientist to head EPA’s Office of
Research and Development, and to be willing to fight for that
individual’s confirmation by the Senate.142
There is so much that the new team at the EPA will need to do on
the regulatory side that I am not optimistic that reversion to the
baseline scientific processes will occur quickly and am concerned that
quick fixes may lose sight of what the Trump administration has taught
us about the vulnerability of scientific norms to those who have made
their policy decisions in advance. It would be wise not to relax defense
of science at the EPA just because Trump was not re-elected. His
return, or the election of a president with similar anti-science and antienvironmental beliefs, is far from impossible. Further, the potential
threat to the EPA’s science-based regulatory approaches does not come
from just one side of the political spectrum. Those on the left include
many who are post-modernists, who would deconstruct science by
arguing that reality cannot be proven, and that scientific truth does not
exist. When they have their turn, and it is likely that sooner or later
that they will, conservatives may greatly regret having provided the
template for the long-term destruction of EPA’s scientific consensus
processes.
I certainly do not advocate changing the essential differences
between lawyers and scientists. But I do advocate that we understand
and credit these differences. As we each participate in the process
toward achieving the common goal of effective science-based regulatory
142. The incoming EPA leadership of a new administration usually focuses on
policy issues. Not surprisingly, the head of ORD has usually been among
the last to be nominated. See Bernard D. Goldstein, EPA at 40:
Reflections on the Office of Research and Development, 21 DUKE ENV’T
L. & POL’Y F. 295, 297 n. 5 (2010).
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activities, we need to acknowledge that different parts of the process
need to play by different local rules. So as a final recommendation let
me suggest that a major lesson of the Trump administration for the
scientific community is that we need to work harder to educate our
government colleagues, as well as policy makers and the general public,
about the value of adhering to the norms of science.
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